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COMMENTS
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN USDA
PROGRAMS IN THE SOUTH: A PROBLEM
IN ASSURING THE INTEGRITY OF
THE WELFARE STATE
INTRODUCTION
People are dying today in the South. They die for want of food,
clothing, shelter. They die from working terribly long hours on empty
stomachs and from using archaic technology to till worn out fields.'
Or, many of these people give up and move north into already over-
crowded and over-burdened cities.2 They leave behind weathered
shacks, many with no electricity or running water,3 for nature to ab-
sorb and turn to dust. They leave behind their fields for larger, landed
interests and incorporated plantations to absorb and turn to profit.4
These larger landowners turn the fields to profit with the help of
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs.5 They
participate in crop allotment payments administered through the Agri-
cultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS); they get tech-
nological and educational help from the Federal Extension Service
(FES); they finance land purchases, new buildings, and new equip-
ment with low cost loans from the Farmers Home Administration
(FHA).6
Mostly, the plantations are white-owned. Most of the dying, em-
igrating, hungry people are black. They cannot turn the fields to
profit because they are hungry, pain-ridden, debt-burdened, and poorly
skilled. They cannot overcome those handicaps largely because the pro-
grams of the federal government which were designed to help do not
1. See, e.g., Crrzms' BoARD or INQuiRY n-To HU-NoER AND MALNuTRrIO IN THE
UNITED STTES, HUNGER, USA.: A REPORT, Chapter One: The Mississippi Story-A Case
History in Bureaucratic Non-Support (1968) [hereinafter cited as HUNGER REPORT].
2. See, e.g., UN= STATES CIVIm RIGUTS COMMISSION, CYCLE To NowxaR 17-23
(1968).
3. See notes 16 and 29 infra.
4. See generally HUNGER RFPoRT, supra note 1, Chapter Five: Agricultural Policy.
5. Id.
6. Id., and see text accompanying notes 31-87 infra.
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reach them. They are black and they are discriminated against by the
federal agencies.'
This comment will explore an assortment of legal theories which
could be urged in the pursuit of judicial remedies to end discrimina-
tion in the administration of three selected USDA programs. The
particular programs selected from among the many administered by
USDA have been chosen because (1) they have an important potential
for helping the poor black farmer, and (2) they represent three differ-
ent structural types of governmental welfare programs.8
In examining the theme of assuring the integrity of the welfare
state,' this comment first details the magnitude and character of the
social problem and then describes the three USDA programs and the
extent to which they fail to reach the black farmer. It then surveys
the practical results one might seek in court actions, and, finally, it
focuses on the legal problems and theories available for a court attack
on the discriminatory practices.
I. LIFE FOR THE SOUTHERN BLACK FARMER AND
THE IMPACT OF THREE USDA PROGRAMS
A. Living Conditions
The social problem is large in whatever terms one chooses to mea-
sure it. In economic or human terms the conditions are difficult to ap-
preciate, and difficult to believe possible in a nation of wealth and
prosperity. Data from the 1960 census indicated that 1.5 million black
individuals lived on farms in the South, and another 3.2 million lived
7. HIUNCER REPORT, supra note 1, Chapter Five.
8. Generally speaking, FES is an educational program. It is a federally funded state
operation, administered between USDA and state authorities. FHA and ASCS, on the
other hand, are more direct federal programs, but their respective administrative schemes
are different. FHA provides low cost credit for farm establishment and farm improve-
ment, and operates through agency offices staffed by USDA personnel. ASCS adminis-
ters crop allotments and other programs. Its offices also are manned by federal em-
ployees, but management and policy is determined in large degree by a complicated
hierarchy of elected community and county committees and appointive state committees.
9. It should be noted that this is a problem not so much of effecting substantive
change in the programs as it is one of assuring fair administration by the agency per-
sonnel. Furthermore, this comment deals with racial discrimination, not with the more
general problems of the welfare beneficiary. For a discussion of this larger context,
which identifies the relative helplessness of the welfare beneficiary seeking redress
against agencies, see Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 IRv. L. REv. 929
(1968).
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as non-farm residents in the rural areas of the South.'0 Among those
rural black families, 62% had less than $2,000 income in 1959.11
Among their white counterparts, who numbered 4.4 million farm resi-
dents and 13.5 million non-farm rural residents, only 26%o of the
families had incomes less than $2,000.12 This disparity is further ag-
gravated by the fact that the average rural black family was one-third
larger than rural white families.'
After full and careful appraisal of services rendered by agencies
of the USDA, the United States Civil Rights Commission concluded,
among other things, that in both absolute terms and in terms relative
to his white neighbor, the rural southern black is losing ground con-
stantly.'4 And, in the summer of 1968, the Civil Rights Commission,
10. 1960 Cmxsus or POPULATION, PC(2)-lC, Nonwhite Population by Race, table 1,
p. 1.
11. See US. CoimnassIoN oN CaV rm RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUN=TY n FARm PROGRAwS
9-14 (1965) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL OPPORTUITY n; FAnu PRocRAMs].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. For decades the general economic, social, and cultural position of the southern
Negro farmer and rural resident in relation to his white neighbor has steadily
worsened. Whether measured in terms of value of products sold, level of living,
land and home ownership, or schooling, most of the 4.7 million Negroes living in
southern rural areas are seriously disadvantaged when compared with rural white
southerners .... Every 10 years the census has reported a widening gap in income,
education, and housing between southern rural whites and Negroes.
EQUAL OPPoRTUNITY n FAmr PRooRAs at 99. The basis for this conclusion is estab-
lished id. at 9-18. As an example, the following tables, taken from Cowhig and Beale,
Socio-Economic Differences Between White and Nonwhite Farm Populations of the
South, 42 Socr FoRCEs 354 (1964), and appearing in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY n FA=
PRoGRAms at 10-13, show some of the information for farm families. The data for non-
farm rural families, although better on an absolute scale, shows a similar relative pattern.
Average acreage per farm by race for the South
1950 1959
White 175.3 249.0
Nonwhite 47.0 523
Difference 128.3 196.7
Median income-Rural farm families for the South
1949 1959
White $1,366 $2,802
Nonwhite 712 1,259
Difference 654 1,543
Nonwhite as percent of White 52 45
Education-percent of rural farm youth (25-29 years) with 12 or more years of
school for the South
1950 1959
White 24.3 43.8
Nonwhite 7.0 15.8
Difference 17.3 28.0
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again conducting a study of the issues of economic security as they
affect black people in the state of Alabama, reported no progress: 5
Public agencies in Alabama are doing little to break the cycle
of poverty and dependency and assure the victims of slavery
and discrimination the opportunity to lead decent and produc-
tive lives. Black citizens of 16 counties in "black belt" Alabama
are not being helped to stay on the land; nor are they being
equipped with the education and skills to work in the towns. Left
with little choice but to leave rural areas, black citizens are moving
to urban areas. In effect, the South has transformed a regional
problem into a national one to the extent that it exiles its poor
and their problems.
What does an income of less than $2,000 per year mean? First, it
means that black farm families are hungry. An extensive study in the
summer of 1967 revealed that the typical diet consists of grits, biscuits,
and coffee in the morning; vegetables, corn bread, Kool-Aid, for the
noon meal, although there is usually no noon meal after the harvest
season; and vegetables (sometimes mixed with pork parts), corn
bread and Kool-Aid for the evening meal.16
Level of living index-farm operators 14 State average (National average for
1959 = 100)
1950 1959
White 43 89
Nonwhite 19 46
Difference 24 43
Percent of rural farm housing units with 1.01 or more persons per room for the
South
1950 1960
White 25.8 14.6
Nonwhite 47.6 44.4
Difference 21.8 29.8
Percent of rural farm housing units.with hot and cold piped water for the South
1950 1960
White 20.4 60.0
Nonwhite 2.3 9.7
Difference 18.1 50.3
Similarly graphic illustrations of the economic facts of rural life in the South are pre-
sented in NATIONAL SHARECROPPERS FUND, A BETTER LIFE FOR FARM FAfmIEs 6-7
(1963).
15. Commission Hearing on Rural Poor, 1 Cv RIGHTS DIGEST 20 (No. 2, Summer
1968).
16. SounIER RURAL RESmCHr PROJECT (SRRP), FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as SRRP ANNUAL REPORT].
The study referred to in the text [hereinafter cited as the Alabama Study] was con-
ducted by a private organization called the Southern Rural Research Project (SRRP)
730
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The Food Stamp Program has helped slightly, but only two of the
eight counties in the Alabama Study had accepted the program in
1967.11 Half of those interviewed said that they had to borrow money
to buy stamps and such borrowing rendered the farmers more eco-
nomically dependent upon white landlords and merchants. Half of
the non-participants explained that they could not afford the stamps,
while one-third of those who did participate reported unequal treat-
ment by program employees. Two-thirds of the participants reported
being called by first names in the food stamp offices, a traditional
symptom of racism.'8
In 1967, the Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty, chaired by Walter
Reuther, established an independent board of inquiry to investigate
of Selma, Alabama. The information gathering was done by 14 college students from
various parts of the country, and 7 locally trained research assistants. The researchers
used a 23 page questionnaire dealing with farm programs, living conditions, and related
problems, and interviewed black families representing over 5,000 persons.
The study is divided into two parts: Part I entitled Black Farm Families-Hunger
and Malnutrition in Rural Alabama; and Part II, entitled The Extinction of the Black
Farmer in Alabama. The reports were released in 1968, and copies are available at the
University of Washington Law Library.
As regards living conditions, some of the findings of the Alabama Study, Part I,
are as follows:
1. Nearly 25% of the black farm families interviewed eat no fresh meat of any
kind at all. Another 25% eat meat only once a week.
2. Fresh milk is not used at all by 30.0% of the households.
3. Fresh fruit never appears in the diet of nearly half of the Negro farm families
interviewed.
4. 18.51 never eat eggs at all.
5. Over one third of the children suffer from continuous open sores and scabs.
6. In 14.2% of the farm households visited, SRRP interviewers noted one or more
children with very noticeably distended stomachs.
7. 12.7% of the women questioned who had had a pregnancy over the past 5 years
had received no prenatal care. A third of the women had suffered at least one
miscarriage. Two thirds of the rural Negro babies were born at home with the
aid of a midwife.
8. One third of the mothers interviewed had lost one or more children; 68.0% of
these children during their first year.
9. During the first year of life 20.4% of rural Negro babies received no medical
attention whatsoever.
17. The Alabama Study, Part I, supra note 16, at 3 n.2.
18. The Alabama Study, Part I, supra note 16, at 3-5. The median distance to the
food stamp office was 17.6 miles and half of the families complained of extreme trans-
portational difficulties. Few families had automobiles in operation and the price of a
taxi was often in excess of that of the food stamps.
The use of courtesy titles such as Mr. and Mrs. are of course the more common
pattern, but the use of first names for black adults in the South historically has indicated
the inferior status of blacks.
For a detailed description of health problems related to hunger, the failure of the
food stamp program and the political reasons involved, see Drew, Going Hungry in
America, 222 THE ATLANrrc, December, 1968, at 53.
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hunger in the United States. 9 Besides finding that many people were
simply hungry, the inquiry found evidence of retarded growth,2" severe
protein diseases (which may cause permanent brain damage),21 a high
incidence of parasitic diseases,22 lowered resistance to infection,23 list-
lessness, 24 apathy,25 and shortened life expectancy. 26 All such symptoms
are attributable to malnutrition.27 Further, the inquiry suggests that a
correlation exists between the results of hunger and social unrest, dis-
trust, alienation, withdrawal, and frustration.8
A low annual income for the rural black means also that the29
typical home is an unpainted three-room wood frame shack hous-
ing 3-5 adults and 8-12 children-all of whom sleep in three or
four double beds. The floors and ceilings remain in disrepair along
with loosely fitting wood shutters for the windows, all of which
accounts for continual dampness during the rainy season and se-
vere cold during the winter. Cooking and very limited heat are
provided by a small wood-burning, pot belly stove.
These substandard conditions, and many others briefly outlined in
footnotes, persist even though half the families work an average of
9-10 hours daily, and 17% spend 11-15 hours on daily farm work. A
median of 4.7 persons per farm household work the land; one-third
of those are children under ten. Nonetheless, two-thirds of the black
farmers ended 1967 in debt.30
19. HUNGER REPORT, supra note 1.
20. Id. at 20, 21.
21. Id. at 21, 22, 29, 30.
22. Id. at 22-24.
23. Id. at 30, 31.
24. Id. at 31.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See generally id. at 16-38.
28. Id. at 31-32.
29. SRRP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 6. The Alabama Study, Part I, supra
note 16, at 8-12 reports that almost no homes have indoor water, 5% lack electrical
service, 92.7% had no indoor toilet, 72.3% were troubled with rats, fleas, or lice, and
more than half had floors in bad repair. With respect to furnishings and supplies, the
study found 6.1% of the homes had no sheets or pillowcases and almost 2/3 did not
have enough for the entire family. When there were sheets and bedding, it was often
made of fertilizer sacks sewn together. One-fourth of the families had no blankets and
another 1/3 did not have enough. Almost 1/3 of the families had a table too small to
eat family meals together, over 1/3 lacked enough chairs, and 39.6% did not have enough
dishes and other tableware.
30. Alabama Study, Part II, supra note 16, at 1-2. The study also shows that slightly
over 55% of the families continue to plow the land with a mule. Credit is usually
obtained from a plantation owner or merchant, who is often the same individual, in
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B. FES, ASCS, and FHA: Description, Purpose, Structure,
and Administration
The regulations covering the multitude of complex, often interre-
lated programs administered by USDA 1 fill volumes of the Code of
Federal Regulations. Many of the programs affect the lives of southern
black farmers, but this comment will concentrate only on three which
are of pivotal importance: Federal Extension Service, Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service, and Farmers Home Admini-
stration. This subsection sets out the basic purposes and administra-
tive structures of these programs, and the following subsection presents
empirical data tending to show the genuine failure of these programs
to reach the black farmers.
1. The Federal Extension Service
The FES, as the educational arm of the USDA, has been operating
since 1862, when Congress created the Department of Agriculture, its
stated purpose being to gather and diffuse information and to establish
land grant colleges to teach agriculture and mechanic arts32 Extension
work formally became a function of the land grant colleges in coopera-
tion with the USDA with passage of the 1914 Smith-Lever Act. 3 The
statutory mandate is for FES "to aid in diffusing among the people of
the United States useful and practical information on subjects relating
to agriculture and home economics, and to encourage the application
of the same."34 This educational aspect makes FES the key of access
by the southern black farmer to all relevant USDA programs because,
through FES, the individual farmer gains information about the pro-
grams and is aided in acquiring the needed technology to use them.
The work of FES is carried out through the land grant colleges in co-
order to survive the winter. During spring planting, the farmer must again borrow
money, using as collateral his government check and future crops and thus perpetuating
his cycle of poverty.
31. For a detailed discussion of the history of the USDA and its many programs and
agencies, see USDA, CFaNrnm or SERvicE: THE FIRsT 100 Ynms or =HE U.S. DEPART-
iENT or AcRicun.TuR (1963).
32. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387 (now 5 U.S.C. § 511 (1964)); and
The First Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 [1862] (now 7 U.S.C. § 301 (1964)).
33. Ch. 79, 38 Stat. 372 (1914), as amended 7 U.S.C. § 341 (1964). See generally
EQUAL OPPORTUITy In FARM PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 19-57.
34. 7 U.S.C. § 341 (1964). The basic statutory framework for FES is presently
found at 7 U.S.C. § 341 et seq. (1964).
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operation with the USDA.3 If a state has two or more such land grant
colleges, that state's legislature is empowered to direct the division of
the federal FES appropriations between the colleges.36 However, the
federal statute sets general standards for the program, defining "co-
operative agricultural extension work" as being the37
giving of instruction and practical demonstrations in agriculture
and home economics and subjects relating thereto to persons not
attending ... said colleges.. ., and imparting information on said
subjects through demonstrations, publications, and otherwise and
for the necessary printing and distribution of information in con-
nection with the foregoing; and this work shall be carried on in
such manner as may be mutually agreed upon by the Secretary of
Agriculture and the State agricultural college or colleges ....
The proper state officials, typically faculty members of land grant
colleges, must submit annual plans of work to the Secretary, who, upon
approval of the plans, determines the annual appropriation for agricul-
tural extension work for each state.3" The statute requires the states
to supply matching funds and provides an allocation formula, based
primarily upon a state's percentage of rural and farm population, which
is applied by the Secretary in determining appropriations as between
the states. 9 The average federal contribution in 1964 to the 11 southern
states4" was 41.5 %.41
Each state office staff includes a director, appointed subject to USDA
approval. The state extension service develops cooperative financing
and administration with the various county governments within the
state. This responsibility extends to establishing priorities of work,
allocation of time and resources, and assignment of staff. At the local
level, the county and home agents are responsible for performing the
duties outlined in the federal statute: supplying information to the
individual farmer and his household regarding various USDA programs
and benefits, methods of farming, and home management. These local
35. Land grant colleges are established pursuant to 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-328 (1964).
36. 7 U.S.C. § 341 (1964).
37. 7 U.S.C. § 342 (1964).
38. 7 U.S.C. § 344 (1964).
39. 7 U.S.C. § 343 (1964).
40. Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida,
South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia.
41. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN FAIM PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 21.
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agents are also assisted by a county advisory committee, selected by
the county agent or agents, which drafts a county plan of work 2
Traditionally, 17 states maintained legally segregated land grant
colleges and FES services 3 In 1965, after the 1964 Civil Rights Act
was passed, the USDA issued regulations requiring that the services
be formally integrated.4
2. The Farmers Home Administration45
The FHA is a program of low-cost credit and supervised farm man-
agement. Unlike FES, it administers a direct federal program from
Washington through state and county offices staffed by federal employ-
ees. Eligibility for assistance is determined at the county level by a
committee of three local residents appointed by the state director. A
state committee made up of federally appointed state residents advise
the state director on matters of policy and procedure.4
The purpose of the program is to extend financial credit to owners
of farms and other real estate in rural areas to enable them to con-
struct, improve, alter, repair, or replace dwellings, farm buildings, and
land, in order to provide them, their tenants, lessees, sharecroppers,
and laborers with decent, safe, and sanitary living conditions and ad-
equate farm buildings." To be eligible for a loan, in the case of a
farmer, he must show that he is the farm owner and is lacking "decent,
safe, and sanitary" dwellings for his family or workers or tenants, or
42. Id. at 20-22.
43. UNITED STATES ComusSloN ON CIvI= RIOuTS, EQUAL PROTECTION or THE LAWS
nr PuBlic HIGHER EDUCATION 278 (1960). The 17 states were: Alabama, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
44. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1 et seq. (1970).
45. The basic statutory framework of FHA and its programs is found in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1471-1472 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1471-72 (Supp. IV, 1969), § 1473 (1964),
§ 1474, 1476 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1474, 1476 (Supp. IV, 1969), §§ 1478-79
(1964); and in the Consolidated FHA Act of 1961 found in 7 U.S.C. §§ 1013a, 1921-22
(1964), § 1923-24 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1923-24 (Supp. IV, 1969), § 1925
(1964), § 1926 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1926 (Supp. IV, 1969), § 1927 (1964),
§§ 1928-29 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1928-29 (Supp. IV, 1969), § 1941 (1964),
§§ 1942-43 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1942-43 (Supp. IV, 1969), § 1945 (1964), § 1946
(1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1964 (Supp. IV, 1969), §§ 1961-67 (1964), § 1981 (1964),
as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1981 (Supp. IV, 1969), § 1982 (1964), § 1983 (1964), as amended,
7 U.S.C. 1983 (Supp. IV, 1969), §§ 1984-87 (1964), § 1988 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C.
1988 (Supp. IV, 1969), §§ 1989-90 (1964).
The USDA regulations for FHA are printed in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1823.1-239 (1970).
46. See generally EQUAL OPPORTUNITI iN FAn.m: PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 57-83.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1471(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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is without other farm buildings adequate for the type of farming in
which he is engaged or desires to engage. He must also show that he
is without adequate financial resources of his own and that he is unable
to secure the credit elsewhere "upon terms ... which he could reason-
ably be expected to fulfill. ' 4 If the applicant is eligible and appears
to have the ability to repay with interest, the Secretary, through the
FHA, may make the loan for a period of not more than 33 years and
at a rate of interest not exceeding 5%o per annum on the unpaid
balance.49 All capital improvements so financed are required to be in
accordance with approved plans and specifications and must be super-
vised and inspected as the Secretary directs.50
There are also available special loans and grants for minor improve-
ments, up to an amount of $1,500, even though the applicant cannot
qualify under the financial security requirements mentioned above.
These are available for such purposes as making a farm dwelling safe
and sanitary, removing hazards to health, repairing roofs and providing
toilet facilities, water supply, structural supports, screens, etc.5'
Under the Consolidated FHA Act of 1961, -52 a great variety of loans
are available and to an expanded class of possible beneficiaries. The
Secretary is authorized to make and insure loans to farmers who (1)
are citizens, (2) have a farm background and either training or ex-
perience which the Secretary determines to be sufficient to assure
reasonable prospects of success in the proposed farming operations,
(3) are or will become owner-operators of not larger than family farms,
and (4) are unable to obtain sufficient credit elsewhere at reasonable
terms and rates. 3 Thus, the applicant need not be an owner so
long as he plans to become an owner-operator54 of a family farm. The
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1471(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1472 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1472 (Supp. IV, 1969).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1476 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1476 (Supp. IV, 1969). Under
this provision the Secretary may also provide special technical services to the borrower
free of charge. Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1476(b)-(d) (1964), provides for research and
study programs to be developed by the Secretary for the purpose of promoting con-
struction of adequate farm buildings, new methods of production, etc., with a view
towards reducing costs of farm buildings and adapting and developing fixtures and
appurtenances for a more efficient and economical farm operation.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1474 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1474 (Supp. IV, 1969).
52. See note 45 supra.
53. 7 U.S.C. § 1922 (1964).
54. The Secretary has defined an "owner" as one with legal ownership of farmland,
and an "operator" as one who is in general control of farming operations on the
particular farm during the program year. 7 C.F.R. § 719.2(o),(p) (1969).
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purpose of loans available under the Consolidated Act and the order
of preference are as follows: (1) acquiring or improving farms, farm
buildings, land; water development, use and conservation; (2) recre-
ational uses and facilities; (3) enterprises needed to supplement farm
income; and (4) refinancing of existing indebtedness.55 The repayment
period for these loans and the interest rates are set by the Secretary,
but may not exceed 40 years and 5% per annum on the unpaid
balance.58
The Consolidated Act also provides for "operating loans" to farmers
under the same criteria as above. These include loans for the following
purposes: paying costs incident to farm reorganization for a more prof-
itable operation; purchasing livestock, poultry, and farm equipment;
paying for farm supplies generally, and essential operating expenses,
including cash rent; water and land development, use and conserva-
tion; recreational facilities; enterprises needed to supplement farm
income; refinancing, and other farm and home needs, including family
subsistence.57 These loans are payable over a period of not more than
seven years and at a rate of interest set by the Secretary, who is to
take into consideration the economic condition of the applicant and
his family.58
The administration of the assets, duties and powers under the Con-
solidated Act and other acts authorizing agricultural credit are assigned
by the Secretary to the FHA, which is headed by an administrator ap-
pointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate.59 To aid in
the carrying out of these credit programs, the statute directs the Secre-
tary to appoint in each county a county committee, consisting of three
55. 7 U.SC.. § 1923 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1923 (Supp. IV, 1969). There
are also available special loans to farm owners and tenants for the purposes of soil and
water conservation and recreational facilities, and water and waste facility loans and
grants. 7 U.S.C. 99 1924, 1926 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1924 (Supp. IV, 1969).
56. 7 U.S.C. 9 1927 (1964).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 1942 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1942 (Supp. IV, 1969).
58. 7 U.S.C. § 1946 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1946 (Supp. IV, 1969). The
Secretary may, through the FHA, compromise, adjust or reduce claims, adjust and
modify terms of mortgages, leases and contracts entered into or administered by the
FHA. However, no such compromise or adjustment may be made on terms more favor-
able to the borrower than recommended by the appropriate county committee. See
text infra at notes 60, 61 and 62. The Secretary does have the power to release mortgages
and contract liens altogether if it appears that they have no present of prospective value.
7 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1981 (Supp. IV, 1969).
59. 7 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1981 (Supp. IV, 1969).
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persons residing therein, at least one of whom must be a farmer.60 The
committee members are to serve three-year terms, removable for cause
by the Secretary, and at rates of compensation as set by the Secre-
tary.6 The function of these county committees is to review all applica-
tions for credit and to certify whether or not the applicant meets the
eligibility requirements.1
2
To summarize the structure of the FHA, each state office is headed
by a state director who is immediately responsible to an FHA regional
administrator." Each county office is under the direction of a county
supervisor, who is responsible to the state director. The local county
office is the normal channel through which the public seeks informa-
tion, makes application for loans, and does business with the FHA. The
local committees, composed of three county residents, review the ap-
plications, make certifications and recommendations, release from per-
sonal liability, and advise on all phases of the FHA programs in the
county. 4
3. The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
The ASCS is an agency of primary importance to those farmers who
grow allotted crops, e.g., cotton, tobacco, and peanuts. Through county
offices, it administers crop allotments and price support programs. The
state and local offices are manned by federal employees. 5
In the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936,66 the
policy and purposes of Congress were declared to be"T
(1) preservation and improvement of soil fertility; (2) promotion
of the economic use and conservation of land; (3) diminution of
exploitation and wasteful and unscientific use of national soil re-
sources; (4) the protection of rivers and harbors ... in aid of flood
control; and (5) reestablishment, at as rapid a rate as the Secre-
tary of Agriculture determines to be practicable and in the general
60. 7 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964). The implementing regulation specifies that all three
members of the county committee must be farmers. 7 C.F.R. § 1800.4 (1970).
61. 7 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
62. The committee shall also determine whether the applicant has the "character,
industry and ability" to carry out his proposed operations. 7 U.S.C. § 1983(b) (1964),
as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1983(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
63. 7 C.F.R. § 1800.3 (1970).
64. 7 C.F.R. § 1800.4 (1970).
65. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITY fN FARM PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 89-99.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 590g-p (1964).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 590g(a) (1964).
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public interest, of [parity of purchasing power between farm and
non-farm persons].
To carry out the purposes specified, the Secretary received power to
make payments and grants of other aid to agricultural producers 6 8
including tenants69 and sharecroppers,70 in amounts determined by the
Secretary 71 Congress directed the Secretary to employ local and state
committees to manage the programs. Each year, farmers within each
community elect from their numbers a local committee of three farmers
for that area. The local committeemen, at a county convention, nomi-
nate and elect a county committee of three farmers who reside in the
county. County committeemen serve for three years and cannot serve
for more than three consecutive terms.7
The local committee elects a secretary and may use the FES county
agent for that purpose. The county committee may also use the FES
county agent as secretary. If not so elected, the county agent is auto-
matically an ex officio member of the county committee without vote.73
Each state has a state committee of three to five farmers, resident in
the state and appointed by the Secretary. The state director of FES
is an ex officio member of the state ASCS committee.7 4
The determination of the boundaries of elective areas (communities)
is by the state committee. No community may include more than one
county.75 Those eligible to vote for local committeemen and delegates
to the county convention are any person of legal voting age who has
68. A "producer" is an owner, landlord, tenant or sharecropper who is entitled to
share in the crops available for marketing, or in the proceeds thereof. 7 C.F.R. § 719.2(s)
(1969).
69. A "tenant" is (1) a person, usually called a "cash tenant," "fixed-rent tenant,"
or "standing rent tenant," who rents land from another for a fixed amount of cash or
of a commodity to be paid as rent; or (2) a person, other than a sharecropper, usually
called a "share-tenant," who rents land from another and pays a share of the crops or
proceeds therefrom as rent. 7 C.F.R. § 719.2(y) (1969).
70. A "sharecropper" is a producer who performs work in connection with the
production of a crop under supervision of another and who receives a share of such
crop for his labor. 7 C.Y.R. § 719.2(w) (1969).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b) (1964).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. This section further provides that the Secretary should make such regula-
tions as necessary relating to the selection and exercise of the functions of the respective
committees, and to the administration of the programs through such committees. In
doing this, the statute expressly directs the Secretary to protect the interests of tenants,
sharecroppers and small producers.
75. 7 CF.R. § 7.7 (1970).
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an interest in a farm as an owner, tenant or sharecropper, 0 and any
person not of legal voting age who is in charge of the supervision and
conduct of the farming operation of an entire farm. 77 County and
community elections are called and set by the Deputy Administrator,
State and County Operations, ASCS,78 in such a manner as will, in his
judgment, afford full opportunity for participation by all persons
eligible.70 The existing county committee is generally responsible for
conducting the community elections in accordance with the Deputy
Administrator's instructions, and is also responsible for the conduct
of the county convention for the election of a new county committee. 0
The regulations specify many eligibility requirements and causes of
removal for community and county committeemen and other ASCS
employees."' One eligibility requirement for a county or community
committeeman, which is important here, is that he not have been re-
moved for refusal to carry out the USDA's policy relating to equal
opportunity and civil rights,8 2 and that he not have been disqualified
from future services as a result of a determination by the state com-
mittee that during his previous services as a committeeman or ASCS
employee he refused to carry out USDA policy relating to equal op-
portunity and civil rights. 3
The duties of the county committee, subject to general direction and
supervision of the state committee, are generally to carry out in the
county, through the community committeemen, the agricultural con-
76. These terms are defined in notes 54, 69 and 70 supra.
77. 7 C.F.R. § 7.5 (1970). Eligibility also assumes that the farm itself is eligible for
an allotment payment under at least one of several acts administered by the ASCS
Committee structure.
78. 7 C.F.R. § 719.2(i) (1969).
79. 7 C.F.R. § 7.8 (1970). This section goes on to provide that the state committee
which is composed of direct appointees of the Secretary may determine that the elec-
tion did not reflect the views of a substantial number of eligible voters or that such
election was not in substantial accordance with instructions of the Deputy Administrator,
and declare the election void and call a new one.
80. 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.9, 7.10 (1970). The election of the community committee and
delegates to the county convention is by secret ballot with a right to write-in. Each
year, three members and two delegates are elected. The three elected are the community
committee and also delegates to the county convention. 7 C.F.R. § 7.11 (1970).
81. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.15-7.17, 7.28-7.31 (1970).
82. The policy is primarily set forth in 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1 et seq. (1970).
83. 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.15(e)-(f) (1970). Refusal to carry out USDA policy relating to
equal opportunity and civil rights is also specified as a cause for removal of a com-
munity or county committeeman or ASCS employee. Upon removal or suspension for
this and other causes, there is a right to review by the state committee and then the
Deputy Administrator, but no hearing is specified. 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.28-7,31 (1970).
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servation programs, price support programs as assigned, acreage allot-
ment and marketing quota programs, and others. 4 To accomplish this,
the county committee is directed to lease office space, employ an office
manager and other personnel at compensation set by the Deputy Ad-
ministrator, direct the activities of community committees, make avail-
able to farmers information about the programs administered through
the county committee, and recommend desirable program changes to
the state committee 5 The community committee is charged with the
duties of assisting the county committee in carrying out the programs
assigned, informing the farmers regarding the purposes and provisions
of such programs, conducting community meetings and such other
duties as assigned by the county committee. 0
It is important to note that nothing precludes the Secretary, ASCS
Administrator, or Deputy Administrator from administering any or all
programs and functions delegated to a community committee, county
committee, state committee, or any employee. In doing so, the federal
official may designate persons of his choice to carry out the programs
and other functions for such period as may be necessary. 7
C. Failure at the Local Level
In large measure, the three agricultural programs described above
have failed to reach the southern black farmer and his family at the
local level. The causes of that failure are complex, but it is clear that
USDA personnel have contributed significantly thereto. 8
84. 7 CF.R. § 7.20 (1970).
85. Id. The regulation also specifies that there may be no racial discrimination in
the hiring of an office manager and that such manager may not be removed by the
committee for advocating or carrying out USDA policy on equal opportunity and civil
rights.
86. 7 C.F.R. § 7.22 (1970).
87. 7 C.FR. § 7.37 (1970).
88. "The experience of the staff indicates that poverty in the black South is directly
related to active discrimination by southern Federal employees of the USDA and passive
acquiescence of the national USDA." SRRP Amcu_ REPoRT, supra note 16, at 6. Citing
the Alabama Study, the SRRP ANamAL RExoRT, at 5-6 found:
1. The vast majority of black farmers fear the employees of Federal farm programs,
a situation which results in a low level of eligible participants in programs. The
black farmer, conditioned by years of experience, views the farm program em-
ployee as the southerner who calls him "nigger," "boy," and "grandpa." The
black farmer knows that if he goes to one of the agency offices, he will have to
wait on a long line and watch while the white man is attended to as soon as he
enters. He also knows that if he angers the local agent with his persistence, his
credit with the local merchants may be canceled. [Footnotes deleted.]
2. The ASCS cotton allotments and subsidy checks for blacks are lower than those
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According to the Alabama Study, 9 the role played by the FES in
the counties surveyed is negligible with regard to blacks. Of those who
had had contact with the FES office, over half of the black farmers
reported that they were called by their first names or something less
courteous. Over 60% stated that they were treated as inferior persons
by the office personnel." Amazingly, 80% reported that they had never
been visited at home, farm, or church by an FES agent. Of those
visited, 88% said it was a black agent.91 Three-quarters had
never been visited by a home demonstration lady and of those visited,
94% of the visits were by a black agent.9 2 These figures clearly demon-
strate that the patterns of rigid racial segregation continue to exist.
An important function of extension agents is to advise the farmer
on soil conditions and how to improve them, yet 75% of the farmers
interviewed had never had their soil tested, and of the 25 % which had,
almost half were never told the results.9 Thus, the black farmer is
effectively isolated from knowledge about federal programs and the
technical assistance which is necessary to improve his home and farm.
He is likely to feel intimidated, unwelcome and discouraged from ac-
tively seeking aid in FES offices. Generally, he neither participates in
nor benefits from federal farm programs.
The United States Civil Rights Commission has found that the pat-
tern of unequal service to black farmers by FES exists throughout the
11 southern states.9 4 It states that the federally assisted extension ser-
vices are administered through a racially separated structure and gen-
erally on a discriminatory basis, often with inferior offices for black
staff; that separate plans of work are normally made for services to
for whites. FHA loans for the purchase of land, equipment, and the improvement
of farm buildings are virtually unavailable for blacks, and the rejections are
rarely recorded. The county agent of the Extension Service, whose job it is to
pass on information acquired at the federally supported Land Grant Colleges,
rarely does so for black farmers.
89. See note 16 supra.
90. Alabama Study, Part II, at 4-5, 8-9.
91. Id.
92. Id. A study of 12 Alabama counties in 1967 revealed that there were 46 white
extension agents and 26 black agents to serve a rural population of approximately
27,000 whites and over 72,000 blacks. Id. at 8 n.3, citing oral testimony of William C.
Payne, Jr., Program Analyst United States Commission on Civil Rights.
93. Alabama Study, Part II, at 9.
94. EQuAL OPPORTUNITY IN FARx PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 25-57. The 11 states
considered were Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia.
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blacks at the county level and that in counties where both black and
white are employed, they generally do not plan programs or otherwise
meet together. The result is that black agents generally have inferior
training because they are denied access to the training furnished their
white co-workers. The responsibility to work with black farm families
is typically assigned to black staff, if there is such, and the case load
of black workers is too large to permit adequate serviceY5
As a result, thousands of black youth are denied equal benefits, ac-
cess to national programs of the extension service through 4-H Clubs,
and the opportunity to compete with white youth for state and national
4-H awards. 6 Black rural homemakers receive less assistance than
whites in the same county and many receive no service whatever in
counties where there is no black staffY7 Black farmers are denied access
to services provided to whites which would help them diversify crops,
increase production, achieve adequate farming operations, or train for
non-farm employment.98 Furthermore, the Commission found that fed-
eral as well as state and local officials have participated in the dis-
criminatory practices. There appears to be a preconception on the part
of many federal, state and county extension workers that blacks as a
class cannot succeed in agriculture.99
The failure of the FHA is also dismal. The Alabama Study shows
that about 93%o of those black farmers who had been to FHA offices
said that they were called by their first names, or something less cour-
teous, and 60.8% replied that they were treated as inferior persons in
those offices. Over 95 % said that they never had received help or advice
from any member of the FHA county committee and 87% had never
received any loan or advice from the FHA county supervisor or people
in his office. Approximately 85% had never heard of any meeting held
by the FHA and 71.6% of the farmers were not even aware that FHA
made loans for improvement of soil and water. About two-thirds of the
farmers were unaware that FHA loans were available for family or
farming costs or that FHA made loans to help buy land, while 57.4%
99. Id.
96. Id. at 10-106.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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were unaware that FHA made loans to build, buy or repair a house or
farm building.'00
The Civil Rights Commission investigations confirm the conclusion
that the FHA provides inadequate services to the black farmers in the
11 southern states generally. 0 1 The commission states that assist-
ance rendered blacks in a given economic class is consistently different
from that given to whites in the same economic class. Black borrowers
receive smaller amounts, both absolutely and in relation to their net
worth. Whites are given careful supervision by the FHA and receive
most of their funds for capital investment, while blacks, in the same
economic class and with drastically unequal supervision, receive loans
primarily for living expenses and annual costs. The reason, concludes
the Commission, is probably the preconception that blacks, as a class,
are somehow inferior and cannot succeed in farming. 2 The Commis-
sion also states that there is a discriminatory pattern against blacks
by FHA in employment, advancement and opportunities, and that
there are segregated services where there are black personnel. 3
Similar findings apply to ASCS. The Alabama Study shows that
about 94% of the black farmers responding to the questionnaires were
called by their first names, or something less courteous, at the ASCS
offices, while 55.6% felt that they were not treated equally to whites
at those offices. Over 95% reported never having received help or ad-
vice from ASCS community committees and 95% had never received
help or advice from a county committee. Approximately 75 % said they
never had been visited by an ASCS representative at farm, home or
church, and never had received help or advice from the ASCS office.
Two-thirds never had heard of a meeting held by ASCS. It should be
recalled that a basic philosophy of ASCS, as FES, is grass roots par-
ticipation and control by local people of local policy. Two-thirds were
unaware that they could appeal the amount of their cotton allotment
and the same proportion was unaware of any government program to
help with water and soil problems. 04
100. Alabama Study, Part II, at 4-5, 7-8, 10-11.
101. EQUAL OPPORTUNrrY IN FARM PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 57-83, 106.
102. Id.
103. Id. For a thorough discussion of FHA and exhaustive documentation of the
discriminatory administration of programs at the local level, see S. Zimmerman, Legal
Control of Government Benefit Program, 1967 (unpublished manuscript on file at
New York University Law Library).
104. Alabama Study, Part II, at 4-7, 10.
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As regards the ASCS, the Civil Rights Commission found that the
situation is bleak for the black farmer in southern states generally.
Until 1964, blacks had not participated, with rare exception, in the
nominations and elections for ASCS community committees, which
elections are directly under USDA supervision and jurisdiction.0 5 In
1964, of 37,000 community committee members in the South, only 75
blacks were elected and there were no black county committeemen.
Furthermore, blacks were not employed in permanent federal or county
ASCS positions, nor were they appointed to the important temporary
positions filled each year by county committees. The Commission, re-
porting in 1964, stated that no blacks had ever been appointed by the
Secretary to a state ASCS committee in the South."°6
In June of 1965, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman issued a progress
report 0 7 to the President answering various charges by the United
States Civil Rights Commission, some of which are discussed above.
The Secretary's report gives the impression of important advances in
eliminating discriminatory practices in the administration of farm pro-
grams. For example, he states that 37 blacks have been appointed to
state ASCS committees in the eleven southern states. However, the
Alabama Study, conducted in 1967, and a report of the Commission
hearings in Alabama during April of 1968 show, in the words of the
Commission staff investigators, that "there has been no significant
change in agricultural programs in Alabama."'0 8 One may reasonably
assume that the same conclusion applies to rural areas in the other
southern states. The relatively little progress in school desegregation
105. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
106. EQUAL OPPORTUITY IN FARM PROGRAMS, supra note 11, at 89-98, 107-08.
107. DEPART=NT or AcRicuLTURE, PROGRESS REPORT ox ELIINATiON or D.sm -
NATION (1965).
108. U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, CYCIS TO NOWHERE, at 17 (1968). The Com-
mission goes on to state:
This means that a lot of law is being broken in Alabama with the Federal Govern-
ment accessory before and after the fact. Many Negroes feel that behind the law-
lessness is a systematic effort by white Alabamians to force politically renascent
Negroes out of the State by making life on the land untenable. Whether or not
this is the intent, the effect ... is apparent.... Thousands have been evicted from
tenant farms to drift like flotsam, washing up in Northern ghettos or in Alabama
urban centers where the menial jobs are colored black. Rev. William Branch, a
civil rights leader . . . , saw nearly 100 families turned out overnight, stunned and
penniless in a State that would not help them to shelter infants . . . while the
Federal Government looked the other way.
See also HUNoE REPORT, supra note 1, Chapter 5: Agricultural Policy.
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since Brown v. Board of Education0 9 16 years ago certainly does not
make one optimistic about the prospects for the agriculture welfare
programs.
II. TOWARDS JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
A. Introduction
At least as regards the southern black farmer, the USDA programs
designed to help him attain a self-sustaining and dignified status, are
intertwined with a racist cultural context and, for that reason, have
failed in a wholesale manner." 0 The federal government, through its
officials and employees, not only has acquiesced in the discriminatory
practices, but has directly contributed to them."' For the southern
black farmer, there is generally despair, extreme poverty and racial dis-
crimination. 2 His problems are many and their amelioration will
require a lengthy and arduous campaign of lawsuits, lobbying, public-
ity, education and political organization.
In comparison to the problems at hand, the function of this comment
is a modest one. It focuses on the various problems of three specific
USDA programs and will attempt to develop and identify major legal
theories which might be pursued in correcting those problems. For all
three programs, the basic problem is how to make use of judicial means
to correct a system which is corrupted in a wholesale fashion.
Regarding the FES, which is in many aspects a federally subsidized
local program,13 the basic concern is that the wide variety of technical
assistance, information and educational help reach all farmers on an
equal basis. Regarding the FHA, a purely federal program," 4 the prob-
lem presented is more one of directly attacking federal agencies and offi-
cials, and seeking equal treatment for black farmers in receiving loans
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. The experience of the staff indicates that poverty in the black South is directly
related to active discrimination by southern Federal employees of the national
USDA.... They also witnessed the fact that in Mississippi and Alabama, and
probably elsewhere, a prosperous nation is not feeding starving and near-
starving citizens.
SRRP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 6. See also HuNGER REPORT, supra note 1, at
77-83.
111. See, e.g., notes 94-99, 101-103, 105-106 and accompanying text supra.
112. See, e.g., note 108 supra.
113. See notes 32-41 and accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text supra.
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and supervisory assistance. Regarding the ASCS, a more mixed pro-
gram as regards federal versus local control," 5 the desired goals are
equal and free participation by black farmers in the elections, equal
and fair administration of programs by ASCS committees and, hope-
fully as a natural result, more black farmers elected to county and
community committees.
B. Legal Theories and Problems
1. FES-Federal Funds and Guidelines to State Agencies
(a). Green v. County Board-Application of School Desegregation
Principles. The FES is a program of public education for adult stu-
dents; they are nonresident students in the sense that they do not
attend school at a central place. The underlying rationale and reasons
which led to the holdings of Brown v. Board of Education"6 and its
progeny should require that similar legal remedies be applied to FES
to assure equal educational and agricultural services to the southern
black farmer. FES, like other school systems, is a federally subsidized
state operation." 7 As in the school desegregation cases, the racially
discriminatory pattern in which FES programs are administered at
the local level is a fruit of legally enforced segregation." 8 Until this
decade, 17 states maintained legally segregated FES services." 9
FES is the educational arm of all agricultural programs benefitting
the individual farmer and is administered through the state land-grant
colleges in cooperation with the USDA.2 0 The Smith-Lever Act of
1914,121 the basic federal statute creating FES, affords similar treat-
ment to the individual farmer and his family as would be given to a
115. See notes 65-74 and accompanying text supra.
116. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117. See notes 35-44 and accompanying text supra.
118. For example, the state of Mississippi has established two land grant colleges:
Alcorn Agricultural and Mechanical College for black students and Mississippi State
College for the white. All FES functions are allocated to Mississippi State, and Alcorn,
created "for the education of colored youth" is excluded from any responsibility of
administering FES programs except as it might be delegated from the white officials at
Mississippi State. Hopefully, the black farming population of Mississippi is not entirely
excluded from participation in FES benefits. For example, Mississippi law expressly
authorizes the agricultural extension service officials at Mississippi State, *with the ap-
proval of the president of the college, to establish a separate but, one assumes, equal
camp for "Negro 4-H Club members." See 5 Mhss. Con ANN. §§ 6689-6704 (1952), 3
MSS. CODE AxN. § 2964 (1956).
119. See note 43 supra.
120. See text supra at notes 37-38.
121. 7 U.S.C. § 342 (1964).
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nonresident student. It defines "cooperative agricultural extension
work" as being the "giving of instruction and practical demonstrations
in agriculture and home economics and subjects related thereto
to persons not attending or resident in said colleges."' 22
The first case of Brown v. Board of Education 23 declared "the fun-
damental principle that racial discrimination in public education is
unconstitutional"' 24 as violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied
upon sociological evidence in examining the effect of racial discrimina-
tion on black school children. 2 , In considering these intangible effects,
the Court recognized the necessity of equal access to public educational
opportunities if the individual or racial minority is to fully participate
in society generally. 2 '
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic so-
ciety. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship
.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
Surely the holdings of Brown I and its progeny would apply with
equal force to adult education programs. The rationale of Brown I
clearly is applicable to the southern black farmer in his relations with
FES. The racially discriminatory administration of FES educational
programs' 2 7 not only has contributed to the black farmer's failure in
farming, his condition of economic and often psychological feelings of
inferiority and his poverty, but it continues to reinforce them. The
122. Id.
123. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter referred to as Brown I].
124. The quote, interpreting Brown I, is from the second case of Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) [hereinafter referred to as Brown II].
125. The use of such evidence by the Court has been greatly debated. See, e.g., W.
LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR AND J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw:-CAS S-COMMENTS-
QuEsTioNs 1243-44 (1964) and materials cited therein.
126. 347 U.S. at 493.
127. See text supra at notes 90-99.
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black farmer is effectively excluded from benefits of many agricultural
programs since he is not educated to their existence and uses. He can-
not reasonably be expected to succeed in the business of family farming
because he is denied the equal opportunity of that education. Because
FES is a public education program and because the evils identified in
Brown I are present and continue to be reinforced by racially discrim-
inatory patterns of administration, the issue becomes whether the
principles of the school desegregation cases extend to protect the
southern black farmer.
Brown II declared that the federal district courts would be guided
by equitable principles in fashioning and effectuating decrees such as
'care necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially non-
discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
cases. '1 28 A significant addition in the line of desegregation cases since
Brown I is Green v. County Board129 decided in 1968. The case struck
the phrase "with all deliberate speed" from Brown 11 and held that a
school system has an affirmative duty to take whatever steps are neces-
sary to convert to a racially unitary system in which racial discrimin-
ation is eliminated "root and branch" and to do so by coming forward
"with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistic-
ally to work now."1 0
In Green, the defendant board in 1965 had adopted a "freedom-of-
choice" plan for desegregation in order to remain eligible for federal
128. 349 U.S. at 301.
129. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Two similar cases were decided at the same time: Raney
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 (1968) and Monroe v. Board of Commissioners,
391 U.S. 450 (1968).
130. 391 U.S. at 437-39 (Court's emphasis). Many songs and chants of the civil
rights movement of the late 1950's and early 1960's contained the plea for "freedom
nowI" One wonders whether our society would be significantly different today if the
Court had said "now" in 1954 rather than "with all deliberate speed."
One significant school desegregation case has been decided by the Court since Green:
Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). Certain Mississippi school
districts brought the case, urging that desegregation deadlines be postponed for a
limited period of time. Even the Nixon administration favored some form of post-
ponement. However, the Court upheld Green and restated the law that "a standard of
allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer constitutionally permissible."
The Court held that the lower federal court should issue its order, effective immediately,
that
each of the school districts here involved may no longer operate a dual school
system based on race or color, and directing that they begin immediately to operate
a unitary school system within which no person is to be effectively excluded from
any school because of race or color.
396 U.S. at 20.
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financial aid.131 Under this plan, each student could choose at the be-
ginning of each school year which of the two schools he wanted to
attend, i.e., the black school or the white school. Those making no
choice were assigned to the school previously attended. On its face, the
plan seemed eminently fair. However, for whatever reasons, it did not
work.'32 In three years of operation, not a single white child had
chosen to attend the black school and 85% of all black children in
the school system were still in the black school. 33
Looking to the objective facts, the Court noted that the pattern of
separate schools along racial lines was precisely that declared uncon-
stitutional by Brown I as denying black children equal protection of
the laws. Thus, after 14 years, the defendant school board had failed
to accomplish the transition to a "unitary, non-racial system" as Brown
I had required. The Court concluded:' 34
[A] plan at this late date which fails to provide meaningful as-
surance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system
is . . . intolerable. "The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run
out." ... The burden on a school board today is to come forward
with a plan that promises realistically to work now. (Court's em-
phasis; citations omitted.)
The Court rejected the defendant's "freedom-of-choice" plan not
because it was per se unconstitutional, but because it did not work. 135
131. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, pursuant to Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, issued regulations establishing "guidelines" according to
which schools in the process of desegregation could remain qualified for federal funds.
One method endorsed by the Department was the "freedom-of-choice" plan. 45 C.F.R
§§ 80.1-80.13 (1969).
132. One of the authors has had some personal experience with a similar freedom-
of-choice plan adopted by a Mississippi school system. That one also did not work.
One obvious reason was that white parents would almost never choose to send their
children to the previously all black school. Thus, those schools would remain black.
As for black parents and children it took considerable courage to tell the school authorities
that they wanted the child to go to the previously all white schools. Some black parents
suffered economic reprisals for taking the step and the children were sometimes treated
badly by white students and teachers at the white school. Some black parents felt that
their children would have to have fine clothing before they could attend the "nice"
white schools, which clothing they could not afford. Furthermore, school officials would
change deadlines for request forms or seem to lose request forms from black parents
which were sent on time. In general, it was simply far easier for the black family to
continue in the old patterns.
133. Green v. County Board, 391 U.S. at 441.
134. Id. at 438-39.
135. Id. at 441. In the course of the opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court twice
suggests that zoning might be a good plan for this school district because there were
only two schools in the entire system and there was no residential segregation.
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Thus, the Court gave full effect to its doctrine of substantive equal
protection developed in school desegregation cases by imposing on the
school district an affirmative duty to create now the desired social
result of a unitary, non-racial school system.
Moving to the FES context, the defendant school authorities would
be those state officials at the land-grant colleges responsible for FES
administration at the state level. Also named as defendants would be
the officials of each county office wherein discrimination is alleged.
Applying Green, the substantive equal protection doctrine would be
imposed to require those officials to come forward with a plan which
would work now to attain the desired social result: equal access to the
education, information and aid of agricultural programs available
through the FES. The Court should fashion its equitable decree in
such a manner as to make the plan work and retain jurisdiction to
make sure that it does work. 38
(b). Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964-Section 601 of Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides a clear right to the individual not
to be discriminated against on the basis of race by any program which
receives federal financial assistance 3 7
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
The provision is aimed at the evil of racial discrimination in non-
federal programs which receive federal grants' 38 USDA regulations
pursuant to Title VI expressly cover FES, but do not list the direct
federal programs of FHA and ASCS?'39 Thus, Title VI presents a
possible remedy to the black farmer for the relief from discriminatory
administration by the FES at the state and local levels. Two major
136. This has been the method used in Brown II and Green and the other school
desegregation cases generally.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
138. See generally 67 CoLruo:. L. REv. 1121, 1132-33 (1967).
139. 7 C.F.R. § 15.12, Appendix (1970). The regulations do cover certain limited
programs which involve federal funding of state programs and are administered in part
by ASCS and FHA. Generally, however, ASCS and FHA are direct federal programs
and are not covered by the regulations issued pursuant to Title VI. The USDA has
also issued regulations covering racial discrimination in direct federal programs of the
department. They are found at 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.50-15.52 (1970).
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problems arising under Title VI are whether an "ultimate beneficiary"
must exhaust the remedies specified in Title VI, and whether those
remedies are exclusive, i.e., does the "ultimate beneficiary" have stand-
ing to sue?
Section 602 of the Act 40 provides that each federal department or
agency which extends federal financial assistance to a state or local
agency is directed to effectuate the intent of section 601 by issuing
rules, regulations or orders which shall become effective upon Presi-
dential approval. Compliance with such rules and regulations may
be enforced by termination or refusal of federal funds upon an
express finding of noncompliance after opportunity for hearing, or
"by any other means authorized by law."'' Section 603141 provides
for judicial review of any such department or agency action taken
pursuant to section 602.
Under section 602, the USDA has adopted regulations providing for
nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs of the department. 43
For example, if an individual farmer has a complaint, his administra-
tive remedy is to complain in writing to the Secretary or any USDA
agency which he must do within 90 days of the alleged act of dis-
crimination. The complaint is then "promptly" referred to the office
of the USDA Inspector General where it is investigated in whatever
manner the Inspector General decides and any further action is within
the discretion of the agency or Secretary. 44
The regulations set forth a right to hearing and judicial review if
a "recipient" is adversely affected by departmental action. 45 However,
this does not include the farmer. A "recipient" means a political entity,
institution or individual which received federal financial assistance,
and the regulations specifically exclude any "ultimate beneficiary
under such program." 46 Therefore, the farmer cannot reach the
courts through these USDA regulations and the provided adminis-
trative remedy of submitting written complaints obviously is not
suited for a direct attack by the "ultimate beneficiary."
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964).
141. Id.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1964).
143. 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1 et seq. (1970).
144. 7 C.F.R. § 15.6 (1970).
145. 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.9-15.11 (1970).
146. 7 C.F.R. § 15.2(e) (1970).
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Turning to the question of standing, it is not clear whether Title
VI itself allows the farmer a direct judicial remedy. In Green Street
Ass'n v. Daley,147 plaintiffs, all black and owners or lessees of realty
in the area affected, sued to enjoin a proposed urban renewal project
which, they alleged, was actually for the purpose of Negro clearance
and reestablishment of white commercial trade and business. Reloca-
tion of black families, they charged, would be along racial lines into
other black areas and this would be in violation of Title VI. The court
conceded that plaintiffs were intended as ultimate beneficiaries of the
federal subsidy program to aid local urban renewal projects, but con-
cluded that they were not the direct "recipients" of such funds as
referred to in Title VI. Thus, the court reasoned, plaintiffs were not
persons suffering "legal wrong" because of agency action and were
not entitled to judicial review under section 603 of Title VI or section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.' 48 They lacked standing and
the federal court was without jurisdiction. 49
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'50 affirmed the decision on
other grounds, but it did discuss plaintiffs' theory under Title VI.
As to the federal defendants, the court reasoned, the argument ignored
sections 602 and 603 which establish the procedure to be followed
by federal officials in enforcing the nondiscrimination requirements.
Only after that procedure is utilized is judicial review permitted by
section 603. If an individual suit for injunction were permitted, the
court reasoned, the administrative procedure would be by-passed and,
section 601 could not be intended to permit termination of federal
participation in a given program by such means. As to the local defen-
dants, the court indicated that individual plaintiffs may have standing
for relief under section 601, but assuming this to be true, unlawful
discrimination in the relocation plan was held not to be established.' 5'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the opposite view, at
least in regard to non-federal defendants. In Bossier Parish School
Board v. Lemon,'52 parents of black children brought a class action to en-
147. 250 F.Supp. 139 (N.D. I11. 1966).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
149. 250 F. Supp. at 146.
150. 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967).
151. Id. at 8-9.
152. 370 F.2d 847 (Sth Cir. 1967).
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force desegregation by defendant school board which had accepted fed-
eral financial assistance and had given assurances of nondiscrimination.
One of the defenses to the action was that section 601 of Title VI was
a mere statement of policy and that section 603's administrative
remedies are the only means by which it may be enforced. In holding
for the plaintiffs on this point, the court stated: 5 3
Section 601 . . . states the law as laid down in hundreds of deci-
sions, independent of the statute. In this sense, the section is a
prohibition, not an admonition. In the absence of a procedure
through which the individuals protected by section 601's pro-
hibition may assert their rights under it, violations of the law are
cognizable by the courts.... The Negro school children as bene-
ficiaries of the Act have standing to assert their section 601
rights.
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,5 ' the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois reversed the position it had
taken in Green Street Ass'n. The plaintiffs, all black, were either
tenants or applicants for public housing and challenged, in a class
action, the constitutional validity of the site selection policy of the
defendant housing authority. The allegation was that the defendant
selected sites for public housing almost exclusively within all black or
nearly all black neighborhoods for the purpose and with the result of
maintaining existing patterns of urban residential segregation by race
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The court held that plain-
tiffs had standing to maintain the action under section 601 of Title
VI, citing Bossier and adopting that construction.'55 The court noted
that when the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity
to disapprove of that construction in Green Street Ass'n, it did not do
SO.
1 56
On the basis of Bossier and Gautreaux, the black farmer has
standing under section 601 to challenge, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, the discriminatory administration of at least
153. Id. at 852.
154. 265 F. Supp. 582 (NJ). IMI. 1967).
155. Id. at 583.
156. The arguments in favor of standing gained strength from the recent case of
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). In
that case, it was held that black residents of a planned urban renewal area had standing
to attack the plan as against both federal and state officials.
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the FES, which is a federally assisted state program. A class action
by a group of farmers against state FES officials and the county
directors, assuming proof of unequal service to black residents, should
result in an injunction designed to correct the discriminatory conduct
as was done in Bossier.
Title VI should not be construed as giving only the restrictive
remedy to the "ultimate beneficiary," as was done in Green Street
Ass'n. As the Bossier court stated, section 601 simply articulates a pre-
existing right recognized in hundreds of decisions, i.e., the right
secured by the equal protection clause not to be discriminated against
on account of race. It is quite clearly the intent of Title VI to promote
that right, not limit it. Similarly, the same guarantee of equal pro-
tection applies to protect the individual as against the federal govern-
ment, at least where race discrimination is involved.157 Thus, it
should not matter whether the defendant is federal or non-federal
for purposes of enforcing the right expressed in section 601. The
administrative remedies of Title VI should be construed as controlling
relations between the federal agency and the "recipient, o 8 not the
relations between either and the "ultimate beneficiary."
2. FHA-Federal Funds to Federal Administrative Agency: The
Thirteenth Amendment and Sections 1981 and 1982
FHA is a program of low-cost credit and supervised farm manage-
ment through which various programs are administered providing
loans for many purposes ranging from the purchase of land and
construction of farm buildings to living expenses. 59 There is a per-
vasive pattern of discriminatory treatment of the black farmer by
FHA offices and committees. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission has
found that economic and supervisory assistance rendered blacks in a
given economic class is consistently different and inferior from that
given whites in the same economic class. 60
Section 1982, part of the original Civil Rights Act of 1866,'11 states
157. See text infra at notes 192-201.
158. See generally Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31
AmBANY L. REv. 210, 215-219, 223 (1967).
159. See text supra at notes 45-64 for a general discussion of the structure and pro-
grams of FHA.
160. See text supra at notes 101-103.
161. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (now 42 U.S.C, § 1982).
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simply that "all citizens of the United States shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, sell, hold and convey real and personal prop-
erty."' 62 The provision was passed by Congress, over President
Andrew Johnson's veto, pursuant to the enabling clause of the
thirteenth amendment.163
The meaning of the thirteenth amendment and of section 1982 was
given an expansive interpretation in the recent case of Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.16 4 Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that defendant,
a private real estate developer, refused to sell them a home for the
sole reason that Mr. Jones was black. The plaintiffs relied on section
1982 and sought injunctive and other relief. The district courtO
dismissed on grounds that section 1982 applies only to state action
and does not reach private refusals to sell. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed.' 66 The Supreme Court reversed, holding "[t]hat
section 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public,
in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed,
is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment."' 6
The Court stressed that concepts of "state action" and "under
color of law" were inapplicable to the thirteenth amendment and
section 1982. By its terms, section 1982 grants to all citizens without
regard to race "the same right" to purchase and lease property "as is
enjoyed by white citizens," and that right can be impaired as effectively
by private sellers as by the state. If a black buyer can be turned down
solely because of his race, he cannot be said to enjoy "the same right."
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
163. The thirteenth amendment reads as follows:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime . . . , shall exist within the United States ....
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
164. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). For discussions of the case, its analysis, implications and
the legislative history of section 1982, see Morris and Powe, Constitutional and Statutory
Rights to Open Housing, 44 WAsr. L. REv. 1, 57-75 (1968); Comment, The "New"
Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. Rav. 1294 (1969); Kohl,
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969); 53 MwNs. L. Rav. 641 (1969); 37 FoRDHAt L. Rv.
277 (1968).
165. 255 F. Supp. 115 (1966).
166. 379 F.2d 33 (1967).
167. 392 U.S. at 413 (1968) (emphasis in original).
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Upon consideration of the legislative history, the Court concluded that
Congress had intended exactly what it had said, i.e., that section 1982
encompasses every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent property.16
On the issue of whether Congress had the power pursuant to the
thirteenth amendment to do what section 1982 purports to do, the
Court held that Congress' power to enforce that amendment "by ap-
propriate legislation" includes the power to eliminate all racial
barriers to acquisition of real and personal property. Citing the
Civil Rights Cases, 69 the Court stated that section 2 of the thirteenth
amendment 1 0 confers upon Congress the "power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery."' 1
Negro citizens . . would be left with "a mere paper guarantee"
if Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of
a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a
white man. 72
The holding of Jones v. Mayer does not, however, apply directly to
aid the black farmer in his attempt to gain equal service from FHA.
The Court expressly noted that section 1982 "does not refer explicitly
to discrimination in financing arrangements." 73 The statement was
made by way of contrast to the Fair Housing Title (Title VIII) of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act 74 because the Court wanted to make clear
that section 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing law as is Title
168. Id. at 420-22. The legislative history is considered at pages 422-37.
169. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
170. See note 163 supra.
171. 392 US. at 438-39. Thus, Congress' power under section 2 of the thirteenth
amendment was construed consistently with standards established by Chief Justice
Marshall in construing the "necessary and proper" clause in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321 (1819):
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
,prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are con-
stitutional ....
172. 392 U.S. at 442-43.
See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), wherein
the principles of Jones are applied and even expanded. That case deals with the leasing
of real property, and also specifically holds that money damages are available for injury
to one's section 1982 rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964). Furthermore, the case holds
that section 1982 and Jones also protect and support the white person who joins the
minority person in asserting those rights contained therein.
173. 392 U.S. at 413.
174. Id. at 417 n.21.
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VIII and that the latter provides wider coverage and easier procedures
in many respects. On the other hand, the implication of the above
quote from Jones is that section 1982 reaches wherever the economy
reaches. Obviously the coverage of section 1982 cannot be so extra-
ordinarily broad, otherwise it would reach, for example, the small
group of white bigoted friends who gather at the private home of the
host who makes the mistake of charging for the drinks. Could they
not refuse a black party crasher in light of section 1982?
One writer'75 suggests that the meaning of Jones is that section
1982 reaches those limitations upon "freedom" and "relics of slavery"
which serve as obstacles to the attainment of "fundamental rights."
This analysis is suggested in Jones and is borrowed from Mr. Justice
Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. 6 The question becomes:
What rights are "fundamental" and thus protected under the thirteenth
amendment? It is suggested that the definition of such a right should
be those rights "crucial to the capacity of Negroes to throw off the
last shackles of slavery and to achieve social mobility" 77 -in that the
concept of section 1982 is that whites as the dominant class have
certain rights and that all others shall have equal rights. The Jones
holding establishes one such "fundamental" right: "[T]he right
to live wherever a white man can live."' 7 Under this analysis, the
focus is on the narrow interest involved rather than economic activity
in general. Equal access, free of racial discrimination, to adequate
housing and employment is obviously more important to blacks'
capacity for social mobility than membership in any and all private
associations.
Before examining the applicability of the principles of Jones
and section 1982 to the FHA problem, section 1981 should also be
considered: 17
9
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
175. Comment, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1294, 1310-12 (1969).
176. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
177. See Comment, supra note 175, at 1311-12.
178. 392 U.S. at 443.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
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equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, and exactions
of every kind, and to no other.
Like section 1982, section 1981 was part of the original Civil Rights
Act of 1866, passed pursuant to section 2 of the thirteenth amendment,
and contains the concept that black citizens ought to enjoy, equally
with white citizens, the rights therein specified. It should be noted
that the provision, by its terms, also is not limited by concepts of "state
action" and "under color of law," and that it is even broader than
section 1982 in that it declares that all citizens have the "same
right.., to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens."
Section 1981 was last considered by the Supreme Court in 1906
in Hodges v. United States. 0 In that case the defendants had been in-
dicted for conspiring to prevent certain black citizens from performing
their employment contracts. A conviction was obtained under what is
now 18 U.S.C. 241.'81 However, the Supreme Court held that the
thirteenth amendment did not vest the jurisdiction in federal courts
to remedy the injury alleged; that any remedy must be sought through
state action and state tribunals. The Court's construction of the
thirteenth amendment was that it only gives power to Congress to
enforce the denunciation of slavery and involuntary servitude in the
very strict sense.
However, the Court in Jones held that Hodges, to the extent that
it is inconsistent with the Jones holding, is overruled. " Thus, the
Court implied its willingness to give substantive content and enforce-
able remedies under section 1981 as it has under section 1982. In
the context of Hodges and under the foregoing analysis, this would
mean that if freedom from racial discrimination in the contracting
of one's labor is a fundamental right crucial to the capacity of blacks
to throw off the last shackles of slavery and to achieve social mobility,
and if this right outweighs countervailing interests of the state and
other individuals, it is protected by both the thirteenth amendment
180. 203 U.S. 1 (1906), Justices Harlan and Day dissenting.
181. See note 267 infra.
182. 392 US. at 441 n.78.
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and section 1981, and is enforceable in a federal court. Freedom from
racial discrimination in employment is, of course, already established
as the national policy and law. 83
It is often the case that the southern black farmer does not have
the "same right.., to ... purchase ... real and personal property"
or the "same right ... to make and enforce contracts" because of the
pattern of discriminatory administration of financial assistance pro-
grams by the FHA.'84 The enjoyment of equal access to rights granted
under these programs is "fundamental" in the sense that they are
necessary to the capacity of the black farmer and his family to throVV
off the last shackles of slavery and to achieve social mobility. Further-
more, it is inconceivable that the federal government, through its
FHA agents and employees, has a legitimate countervailing interest
in denying equal benefits under these programs to the black farmer
on the basis of race. Therefore, the thirteenth amendment and sections
1981 and 1982 should afford the black farmer a substantive right of
equal access to the benefits of FHA programs enforceable in the federal
courts.
By their terms, the thirteenth amendment and sections 1981 and
1982 are not limited by concepts of "state action" and "under color
of law." They reach purely private conduct as in Jones v. Mayer, and
conversely should apply as well against the federal government. For
example, if within a particular state, agents of the federal government
denied to black farmers on account of their race the "same right.., to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by the white citizens,"
the terms of section 1981 apply with the same force as they would
against private action or state action. Thus, if a black farmer went
to the FHA office and applied for a loan to purchase a particular piece
of farmland that was for sale, and was turned down or given unequal
service in terms of the amount or type of a loan or in supervision on
account of his race, those FHA agents would be liable under section
1981 and possibly under section 1982. If, in addition, the private seller
of the farmland refused to deal with the black farmer because of his
race, the seller would be liable under section 1982 and Jones v. Mayer.
183. See, e.g., Titles VI and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d,
2000e (1964).
184. See text supra at notes 100-103.
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Jurisdiction to vindicate these rights under section 1981 and 1982
is clearly established by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964) and Jones v.
Mayer. By its terms, section 1343(4) confers jurisdiction on the
district court to award "damages or... equitable or other relief under
any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights" and,
in such cases, there is no need for the jurisdictional amount of
$10,000.111 If rights under sections 1981 and 1982 are shown to have
been violated, a federal court has power to fashion an effective equi-
table remedy even though the two provisions themselves provide no
explicit method of enforcement.'86 In Jones v. Mayer, while not
deciding whether money damages are available under section 1982,
the Court in effect directed that upon remand the plaintiffs be given
injunctive relief and the right to buy the home which they had chosen
and at the price prevailing at the time of the wrong. 8 7 The Court
assumed that plaintiffs would then not have suffered any uncompen-
sated injury and left open the question of whether a party injured by
violation of section 1982 might have an implied right to compensatory
damages in some circumstances.
For the black farmer, an effective attack on pervasive patterns of
racial discrimination in FHA programs would necessitate a class action
against FHA officials and personnel responsible for large areas. Such
defendants might include county offices and officials, state offices and
officials, FHA area administrators responsible for one or more states,
the chief FHA administrator and perhaps the Secretary of Agriculture.
Presumably, upon proof of the patterns of discriminatory administra-
tion of programs, the district court would issue a mandatory injunction
fashioning an effective equitable remedy as was done in Jones v.
Mayer 8
8
3. ASCS-Federal Funds to Federal Programs Governed by Locally
Elected Committees
(a). Federal Equal Protection-Boiling v. Sharpe. Unlike the FES,
the ASCS is generally a direct federal program and is not primarily
185. See 392 U.S. at 412 n.1.
186. Id. at 414 n.13.
187. Id. at 414 n.14.
188. This approach is also well established in reapportionment and desegregation
cases. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Green v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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educational."8 9 Unlike the FHA, the problems of the ASCS do not
fit conveniently within the terms of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982,190
the ASCS problems being primarily that blacks are not represented
in the decision making process because the local election system and
ASCS employees often discriminate in the administration of their
duties.' 9' Furthermore, no equal protection clause applies, in haec
verba, to the central government. Thus, the issue arises: Is there a
viable doctrine of federal equal protection which will assure to the
black farmer equal treatment at the hands of the ASCS administra-
tion? a9
2
Bolling v. Sharpe,'93 decided with Brown I, makes it clear that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment includes an equal pro-
tection aspect. In ruling that segregation in the District of Columbia
schools was unconstitutional, the Court stated:"'
[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools.... [T]he concepts of equal protection and due process,
both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive.. . therefore we do not imply that the two are
always interchangeable phrases. But... discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process....
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states
from maintaining racially segregated schools, it would be un-
thinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty
on the Federal Government. (Emphasis added.)
The full scope of federal equal protection remains relatively un-
189. ASCS and its programs are described in the text supra at notes 65-87.
190. The use of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1964), in attacking problems related to
FHA is discussed supra at notes 161-184.
Both FHA and ASCS do help to administer some programs which might be charac-
terized as indirect, federally subsidized programs. Examples are direct loans and planning
advances under the Soil and Water Association Loan Program pursuant to certain sec-
tions of the Consolidated FHA Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1926, 1944 (1964) and certain assis-
tance to soil conservation districts pursuant to the Soil Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 590 a-f (1964), administered partially by ASCS. The USDA has put these programs
in the category of indirect federal programs for purposes of coverage by Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. See 7 C.F.R. Part 15, Appendix (1970).
191. See notes 104-106 and accompanying text supra.
192. It should be noted that the same question, and the discussion contained in this
part of this comment, apply also to the FHA which is generally a direct federal program.
For a detailed discussion of federal equal protection see Harvith, Federal Equal Pro-
tection and Welfare Assistance, 31 AXaNY L. Rav. 210 (1967).
193. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
194. Id. at 498-500.
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explored today. In Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Con-
tinental Air Lines,0 5 the Court cited Boiling and Brown I in dictum
which stated that a state or federal law permitting racial discrimina-
tion against job applicants would be invalid under both the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause and the fifth amendment due
process clause. A non-racial case, Schneider v. Rusk,""6 relied on
Bolling and the due process clause to hold unconstitutional a federal
statute which discriminated against naturalized citizens who lived
abroad for three years by revoking their citizenships' 0 7
The most recent case to apply Bolling is Shapiro v. Thompson,'
which held the one year residency requirements for welfare recipients
in the District of Columbia to be unconstitutional congressional denials
of equal protection through the fifth amendment due process clause. 9
The case involved appeals from Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and the
District of Columbia, and stated that the District of Columbia law
violated the fifth amendment due process clause for the same reasons
the Pennsylvania and Connecticut laws were invalid2 0 Those reasons,
in brief, were that the states had shown no "compelling state interest"
to justify the infringement of the constitutional right to travel.2 01
Here there is no necessity to extend the doctrine of federal equal
protection into the economic area since it is sufficient to establish the
reach of the doctrine in racial matters.20 2 It is no doubt safe to assert
that federal equal protection will be coextensive with fourteenth
amendment equal protection in the racial area.20 3 To use what one
195. 372 U.S. 714, 721 (1963). This case dealt with de facto discrimination in employ-
ment rather than segregation by law.
196. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
197. The lower federal courts have relied on the federal equal protection doctrine
of Bolling for various purposes. See Harvith, supra note 192, at 221. For example,
Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963), cert denied,
376 U.S. 938 (1964), held that racial discrimination by a private hospital receiving finan-
cial help from the "massive use" of state and federal funds under a federal statute
violated the equal protection guarantees of the fifth amendment due process clause.
198. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
199. Id. at 642-43. "[Tihe Fifth Amendment . . .forbids discrimination that is 'so
unjustified as to be violative of due process."'
200. Id.
201. Id. at 638.
202. See Harvith, supra note 192 passim, for argument to establish federal equal
protection on a broader basis in the welfare rights area.
203. See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right to Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv.
387 (1967). Also, Harvith, supra note 192, at 222, concludes that Boiling v. Sharpe
squarely holds that racial discrimination in a direct federal program violates the equal
protection guarantees of the fifth amendment.
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commentator terms the "method of inference from the structures and
relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some
principal part, ' 20 4 the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fif-
teenth amendments after the Civil War can have no other purpose
than to secure for blacks full and equal participation in governmental
programs of either the state or the national levels.
The most reasonable conclusion is that at least where racial dis-
crimination is involved, the equal protection aspects of the fifth
amendment will apply with the same force and effect against the federal
government as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment does against the states. In the context of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Supreme Court has declared that any racial classification
is constitutionally suspect and that the state faces a heavy burden to
justify it.205 When similar cases arose in the state and federal contexts
and involved racial discrimination, they were treated similarly in
Brown I and Bolling. Furthermore, Bolling clearly implies that any
racial discrimination on the part of the federal government violates the
fifth amendment due process clause unless it is related to a "proper
governmental objective" and that the burden would be upon the
federal government to justify such discrimination.20 6 It should also
be recalled that the Court in Bolling stated the view that since the
Constitution prohibits states from maintaining racially segregated
schools, it would be "unthinkable" that the Constitution would impose
a lesser duty upon the federal government.20 7
The result is that the black farmer has a constitutionally secured
right not to be discriminated against on account of race in any manner
204. C. BLAcx, STRUCTURE AND RELATiONSmP iN CoNsTrrUTnoNA LAW 7 (1969).
205. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967):
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications ...
be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," . . . and, if they are ever to be upheld,
they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective.
206. 347 U.S. at 499-500:
Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is
free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective.
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper govern-
mental objective, and thus imposes . . . a burden that constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.
207. Id. at 500. As noted, it is Harvith's conclusion, supra note 192, at 222, that
Bolling v. Sharpe squarely holds that racial discrimination in a direct federal program
violates the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment.
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by FHA and ASCS officials or employees in the administration of any
direct federal program.
(b). ASCS Elections-Federal Equal Protection and the Right to
Vote. Assuming there is secured a right against racial discrimination in
the administration of direct federal programs, the question becomes
how that right, and the fifteenth amendment right to vote, °8 coalesce
to affect the ASCS committee election process.20 9 Black farmers do
have a right to vote in the elections which is secured by statute210
and regulations. 11 Therefore, it is submitted that such right to vote is
protected against abridgement or denial for reasons of race because of
federal equal protection21 and because the fifteenth amendment pro-
hibits national as well as state action. 3 An additional issue is whether,
granting that the right to vote in ASCS elections is protected against
racial discrimination, the central government has a duty to take
affirmative steps to improve the opportunity for blacks to participate
in the election and to protect the right to vote.
In Terry v. Adams 214 a voluntary private organization called the
Jaybird Democratic Association held primary elections from which
blacks were excluded. Invariably, the Jaybird candidate would win the
official Democratic Party primary, which candidate, in turn, invariably
would win at the general election. The Supreme Court held that such
a system violated the fifteenth amendment proscription against denial
or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race. The majority
of the Court split into three opinions as to the manner in which state
action was involved, but eight justices agreed that the state had an af-
firmative duty to remedy the situation.
208. US. Const. amend. XV, § 1:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous con-
dition of servitude.
209. The key to fair administration of programs by ASCS lies in equal access to the
committee structure.
The real power in the ASCS program, however, is in the hands of county com-
mittees. These committees are usually elected indirectly by vote of community
committeemen who are directly elected in their communities.
EQUAL OppoRTuNiTy 3N FARM PROGRAMS, svpra note 11, at 91.
210. 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b) (1964).
211. 7 C.F.R. § 7.5 (1970). See also notes 75-80 and accompanying text supra.
212. See text supra at notes 193-207.
213. See note 208 supra.
214. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton, found it
violative of the fifteenth amendment for a state "to permit within its
borders the use of any device that produces an equivalent of the
[constitutionally prohibited] election." 15 Justice Frankfurter was of
the opinion that state action was present because county election
officials participated in the Jaybird primary.216 Justice Clark, joined by
the Chief Justice, and Justices Reed and Jackson, found that the Jay-
bird Association was "part and parcel of the Democratic Party," which
had official status.217 Justice Clark stated his theory as follows:218
Accordingly, when a state structures its electoral apparatus in a
form which devolves upon a political organization the uncon-
tested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in what-
ever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which draw
the Constitution's safeguards into play.
The opinions of Justices Black and Clark thus appear to present a
majority view of the Court that a state may not constitutionally per-
mit an election system to operate which has the result of denying the
vote to the black population, and therefore has an affirmative duty
to alter a system which does so operate.
As regards the ASCS context, there are "elections" involved which
fit the definition given by Justice Black in Terry. Upon examining the
texts of the fifteenth amendment and the enforcing statute,219 Justice
Black stated:22
[T]ogether they show the meaning of "elections." Clearly, the
Amendment includes any election in which issues are decided or
public officials selected. Just as clearly, the Amendment excludes
social or business clubs. And the statute shows the congressional
mandate against discrimination whether the voting on public
issues and officials is conducted in a community, state or nation.
Size is not a standard.
The ASCS elections choose the public officials who sit on the com-
munity and county committees and, therefore, the rule of Terry v.
215. Id. at 469.
216. Id. at 476-7.
217. Id. at 482.
218. Id. at 484.
219. 8 U.S.C. § 31, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1) (1964).
220. 345 U.S. at 468-69.
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Adams set forth above should apply. The Court has shown a special
solicitude for the right to vote and has been ready to place affirmative
duties on the government involved 2 ' The extreme importance of
the committees to successful participation in the programs by blacks
and the demonstrable lack of representation for black farmers should
compel the courts to find that the central government has a duty to
act affirmatively to make the black vote count.
A recent reapportionment case, Dusch v. Davis,222 suggests the
governing principle. The dispute arose over the method of election
of members to the governing council of a mixed urban-rural area
formed when the City of Virginia Beach and Princess Anne County
consolidated. The district court had approved a plan, called the
Seven-Four Plan, wherein four members of the council were elected at
large without regard to residence and the remaining seven members
were elected by the entire city, but one had to reside in each of the
city's seven boroughs. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's
decision.
In the opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court observed that each
councilman represents the city, not the borough of his residence.
Because of the wide variation in borough population, different con-
clusions might follow if, in fact, the borough's resident on the council
represented only the borough. 23
In the course of a quotation from the district court opinion, adopted
with approval by the Supreme Court, there appears the following
passage :224
[T]he 'Seven-Four Plan' is not an evasive scheme to avoid the
consequences of reapportionment or to perpetuate certain persons
in office. The plan does not preserve any controlling influence
of the smaller boroughs, but does indicate a desire for intelligent
expression of views on subjects relating to agriculture which
remains a great economic factor in the welfare of the entire
population. As the plan becomes effective, if it then operates to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population, it will be time enough to
221. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964).
222. 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
223. Id. at 115.
224. Id. at 116-17.
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consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.
(Emphasis added)
It is a reasonable inference from the foregoing quotation that an
election system which in fact operates to produce disproportionate
representation for some groups within a geographic area, the city in
this case, violates the one-man, one-vote requirement of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause. That would be so even though the
election is area wide in form. In the racial discrimination context,
the same principles should apply to the ASCS elections under the
federal equal protection doctrine.
Besides the problem of whether the elections are conducted under
federal auspices, the issue arises whether ASCS elections are of the
type to which the established one-man, one-vote requirements attach.
In Avery v. Midland County,22 the Court held that local govern-
mental units with general governmental powers over an entire geo-
graphic area may not be apportioned among single member districts
of substantially unequal population.226 The Court also held that non-
legislative officers, performing essentially administrative functions, do
not necessarily have to be elected. In Sailors v. Board of Education,227
the Court left open the question of whether, if they are elected, the
one-man, one-vote principle would apply.228
The functions of the ASCS are such as to merit characterizing the
committees as possessing legislative powers.22 They have a substantial
225. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
226. Id. at 485-86.
227. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
228. Sailors concerned a school board's membership which the Court took as being
appointed. The Court identified the board's functions as follows:
The authority of the county board includes the appointment of a county school
superintendent, preparation of an annual budget and levy of taxes, distribution of
delinquent taxes, furnishing consulting or supervisory services to a constituent
school district upon request, conducting cooperative educational programs on behalf
of constituent school districts which request such services, and with other inter-
mediate school districts, employment of teachers for special education programs,
and establishing, at the direction of the Board of Supervisors, a school for children
in the juvenile homes. One of the board's most sensitive functions, and the one
giving rise to this litigation, is the power to transfer areas from one school district
to another.
387 U.S. 105, 110 n.7.
229. The ASCS committees set acreage allotments, control the release of additional
acreage, hear appeals, supervise landlord-tenant agreements, direct the administration of
several programs, provide services in the form of information and help to their con-
stituency, the farmers. See notes 65-87 and accompanying text supra.
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and unique affect upon the lives of their constituency. One commen-
tator notes that "in many areas county government operations are
dwarfed by ASCS programs as measured in dollar expenditures or
impact on residents or both."2 ' In spite of the statutory command to
protect the interests of the tenant, sharecroppers and small producers,
the system has not secured the interests of the black farmer 23 ' There-
fore, policy arguments, as well as the character of the committees'
duties, lead to the conclusion that they be classified as legislative in
nature and thus the Avery holding and requirements should apply.
Alternatively, the Court might resolve the question left open in Sailors
in favor of reapportionment principles which would apply in those
situations where administrative offices are made elective.
To the extent that the lack of black participation in ASCS elec-
tions is attributable to agency action, such as failure to mail notices
to eligible voters, or discriminatory treatment,232 or to agency inaction
which allows the system to be corrupted by local racists, the Con-
stitution should be held to require whatever affirmative action is neces-
sary on the part of federal personnel to correct the abuses. The desired
result might be attained by use of the doctrine of federal equal pro-
tection, the application of the fifteenth amendment, or principles to
be gathered from the reapportionment cases. Once a court is per-
suaded to recognize the problem and determines to correct it, it
should follow the lead in the school desegregation cases by exercising
whatever supervision is necessary to assure fair elections and by in-
sisting that fair elections be conducted now.233
4. Traditional Statutory Remedies
(a). Sections 242 and 1983. These provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. IV, 1969),234 and 42
230. Morton Grodzins, as reported in EQuAL Opno=Rm 3N FARM PROGRAILS
supra note 11, at 89.
231. See HUNGER REPORT, supra note 1, at 77-81, and EQUAL OPPORTUNITY nr FARM
PouGRA.s, supra note 11, 93-97.
232. For instance, the state committee can decide whether the election shall be by
ballot, meeting, or mail. UITaD STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGiCuLTURE, AoaicuvruAL
STABxILZATION AND CONSERVATION SERvIcE, ASCS HANDBOOx: COUNTY AND Co-M-uwrz
ELEcTIOxS § 14(A) (1968).
233. See text supra at notes 128-136 for the discussion regarding the school desegre-
gation cases.
234. Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
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U.S.C. § 1983 (1964),"5 are derived from post Civil War legislation.
Section 242 provides criminal sanctions for certain conduct and is
the counterpart of section 1983, which provides a civil remedy for
generally the same type of conduct. They are treated here together
because the Supreme Court has treated them as parallel provisions and
has construed them consistently. Generally, they proscribe conduct
"under color of any [state] law" which subjects the victim to a depri-
vation of any right "secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States." Upon conviction, section 242 provides a maximum fine of
$1,000 or imprisonment for one year, or both, and if death results, a
maximum of life imprisonment is provided by a 1968 amendment.
Section 1983 provides that the defendant shall be liable to the person
injured in an action at law or suit in equity." 6
Screws v. United States237 is helpful in defining the content of the
apparently vague language of section 242. " 38 The case dealt with in-
dictments under section 242 and the intent required to constitute a
crime thereunder. The petitioners, a sheriff and two other policemen,
were charged with needlessly killing a black prisoner and thus depriv-
ing him of rights secured by the Constitution, i.e., the fourteenth
amendment right not to be deprived of life without due process of
law and the right to be tried by due process of law. Their defense
was that section 242 is unconstitutional because the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause contains no ascertainable standard of guilt
and often is defined in broad and fluid terms not fit for making conduct
criminal.
Adopting an interpretation to preserve the statute's constitutionality,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments . . . on account of such inhabitant being
an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punish-
ment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.
The last clause, following the semi-colon, was added by Congress in 1968.
235. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall he liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
236. Id.
237. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
238. See note 234 supra.
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Justice Douglas, writing the plurality opinion,239 read the word "will-
fully" in the statute to mean a requirement of a "specific intent."
Thus, the plurality opinion held:2"'
A requirement of a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right made definite by decision or other rule of law saves the
Act from any charge of unconstitutionality on the grounds of
vagueness .... One who does act with such specific intent is
aware that what he does is precisely that which the statute
forbids.
Another section 242 case, United States v. Price241 discussed the
meaning of the "under color of law" requirement of sections 242 and
1983. The indictment alleged that three official defendants 242 and
fifteen non-official, private individuals participated in a conspiracy
with the purpose and result of killing three victims. 243 The theory of
the indictment was that the defendants had violated section 242 by
"willfully" subjecting the victims to deprivation of their rights secured
by the fourteenth amendment not to be summarily punished without
due process of law by persons acting under color of Mississippi law 44
The district court had dismissed the section 242 charges against
the fifteen non-official defendants on the ground that their conduct
could not be said to be "under color of law." The Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal and held:2 45
239. Justice Douglas was joined by justices Black and Reed and Chief Justice Stone.
justice Rutledge concurred only for purposes of disposing of the case, but stated that
he agreed with the reasoning of the dissent by Justice Murphy. The latter would have
affirmed the convictions on the ground that there was no problem with vagueness
bemuse the right not to be deprived of life without due process of law is expressly and
clearly protected by the fourteenth amendment.
justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson dissented on the grounds that the crime
is punishable by local law only and that section 242 was never designed for such use.
240. 325 U.S. at 103-04. The exact meaning of the Screws specific intent require-
ment is not clear. It may mean that, at the time of the crime, the defendant had the
specific intent to deprive the victim of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States. Or it may mean that the defendant knew the circumstances and,
if he had been asked, would have known that he was depriving the victim of a secured
right, e.g., the right to trial. There is language in the case by Justice Douglas which
would support either analysis, and lower federal courts have gone both ways. See T.
Eimox, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLIICAL AND C= RiHTs n; nm Umn STATmES
1064-65 and materials cited therein (student ed. 1967).
241. 383 US. 787 (1966) (unanimous decision).
242. Sheriff Rainey, Deputy Sheriff Price and Patrolman Willis of Neshoba County,
Mississippi.
243. The three were civil rights workers and participants in the 1964 Mississippi
Summer Project: Michael Schwerner, James Chaney and Andrew Goodman.
244. Deputy Price had placed the three in his jail for an alleged traffic violation.
245. 383 US. at 794.
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[P]rivate persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the pro-
hibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes of
[section 242] .... It is enough that [the private individual be]
a willing participant in joint activity with the State or its agent.
The Court went on to explain246 that "under color of law" means
the same in section 242 as it does in the civil counterpart, section 1983,
and that in cases involving the same thing as "state action" required
under the fourteenth amendment. For purposes of defining "state
action," the Court quoted from its opinion in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority :147
[There is state action whenever the] state has so far insinuated
itself into a position of interdependence with [the otherwise
"private person" whose conduct is said to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment] that it must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be con-
sidered to have to be so "purely private" as to fall without the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To complete an understanding of the principles and implications
of sections 242 and 1983, consideration must be given to Monroe v.
Pape,24 which treats section 1983. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that
thirteen Chicago policemen, without a search warrant, broke into
their home, routed them from bed, ransacked the house and destroyed
property, and held one of them for ten hours without taking him
before a magistrate and without permitting him access to an attorney
or his family. The theory of their cause of action was that the defen-
dants, acting under color of state law, had violated plaintiffs' rights,
among others, against unreasonable search and seizure contained in
the fourth amendment and made applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colo-
246. Id. at 794 n.7.
247. 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). A private restaurant ]eased from a state agency and
located in a publicly owned parking garage refused to serve appellant because of his
race. Claiming a violation of his rights under the equal protection clause, appellant
sued for declaratory and injunctive relief against the restaurant and state agency. Taking
into consideration the facts that the restaurant was physically and financially a part
of a public building devoted to public use and operated by a state agency, the Court
held that the state is deemed a joint operator of the restaurant and that the latter's
refusal to serve appellant violated the equal protection clause.
248. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343
(1964).
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rado2 49 The Court held, as to the individual defendants, that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action and that Congress in section 1983 had
intended to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights
by an official's abuse of his position s50
The Court also made clear that the federal remedy is independent
and, therefore, it was not relevant that a remedy under state law was
available and had not been pursued by plaintiffs.25' In the circum-
stances of this case, "under color of law" was defined as the "misuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."25
Furthermore, because section 1983 provides a civil remedy, the specific
intent requirement applied in Screws to section 242253 would not be
applied to section 1983. Rather, section 1983 "should be read against
the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his action."25
Applying the principles of the above cases, consideration is now
given to some possible causes of action available to the black farmer
to assure equal treatment by the administration of FES, FHA and
ASCS and access to the benefits and rights under those programs.
First, it should be noted that section 1983 applies to instances of
persons acting under color of state law, while section 242 includes those
acting under federal authority.255 Thus, for purposes of civil actions
against individuals administering FHA and ASCS, which are generally
direct federal programs,255 section 1983 will not be useful unless suffi-
cient state involvement can be found.
FES is generally a federally subsidized state program.25 7 Black
farmers have a right not to be discriminated against on the basis of
race in the benefits of that program, a right founded and secured
in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. More
249. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
250. 365 US. at 172. The Court upheld dismissal of the complaint as against the
City of Chicago on the ground that Congress did not intend to bring municipal cor-
porations within the ambit of section 1983.
251. Id. at 183.
252. Id. at 184, citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
253. See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
254. 365 U.S. at 187.
255. See text at note 246 supra. See also Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965).
256. See text supra at notes 45-50, 65-87.
257. See text supra at notes 32-36.
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specifically, the black farmer is also entitled to the rights provided by
federal statute creating FES, e.g., demonstrations in agriculture and
home economics and access to publications on improving his farm
and information about aid under other agricultural programs.258 To
the extent that the black farmer is denied these rights by the local
FES administration, he is denied rights secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States by persons acting under color of state
law.
Perhaps the most effective remedy in the FES context would be
for several farmers across a given state to bring a class action under
section 1983. For example, defendants named might be officials at
the land grant colleges responsible for state operation, the state office
director and county FES officials. The suit would be for damages and
injunctive relief.259 Hopefully, the school desegregation theory of
Green would be applied and that doctrine of substantive equal protec-
tion would impose on these officials an affirmative duty to formulate
a plan which would work now to attain the goal of equal access to
FES benefits.26" Furthermore, the district court should retain equitable
jurisdiction to see that the plan does work.
Section 1983 would also apply to any state officials, and those oper-
ating in concert with them,261 whose conduct denied to the black
farmer benefits under FHA and ASCS. For example, there have been
cases of hotly contested ASCS elections where black farmers have
organized to get one of their numbers elected to a community or county
committee. The black farmer's right to vote in ASCS elections is
secured by federal statute262 and expressly protected by USDA regu-
lation. 26 3 Thus, attempts by local officials to deny that right on the
basis of race would be conduct under color of state law in deprivation
of the federally secured rights to equal protection and to vote in ASCS
elections. It should be noted also that federal officials and employees
would be liable under section 1983 to the extent that they acted jointly
with local officials in the denial of these rights.
258. 7 U.S.C. § 342 (1964). See also note 37 and accompanying text supra.
259. Section 1983 provides for both. See note 235 supra.
260. See text supra at notes 128-136.
261. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) and text supra at note 245.
262. 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b) (1964).
263. 7 C.F.R. § 7.5 (1970).
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It is also important that the Supreme Court has construed the
concept of under color of law consistently with its concept of state
action.2" Thus, for example, if a county FHA office were housed in
a state building, and if the FHA office generally discriminated against
black farmers in their loan applications, the rationale of Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority265 should apply to find state action
and, consequently, that the FHA officials and employees would be
acting under color of state law such as to be liable to damages and
an injunction under section 1983.
The possibility of relief under section 242, obviously, is at best
indirect in that it depends upon the initiative of the United States
Attorney in bringing the criminal prosecution. If there were such
initiative, the above examples should also result in criminal sanctions,
providing the specific intent of Screws was proved26
(b). Sections 241 and 1985(3). These sections, 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1964)267 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964),218 also are derived from
post Civil War legislation and are treated together because each pro-
scribes generally the same kind of conduct, section 241 on the criminal
side and section 1985(3) on the civil. Both are conspiracy statutes
and generally apply against two or more persons who act jointly to
264. See United States v. Price, 383 US. 787, 794 n.7. See text supra at note 246-247.
265. See note 247 and accompanying text supra.
266. See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
267. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exer-
cised the same...
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.
A 1968 amendment increased the possible fine from $5,000 to $10,000 and provided for
possible life imprisonment.
268. If two or more persons in any State . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . .
or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat,
any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support . . . in favor
of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice
President, or as a member of Congress . . . ; or to injure any citizen in person
or property on account of such support . .. ; in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in
his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more of the conspirators.
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injure, threaten, or intimidate a citizen in the free exercise or enjoy-
ment of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. It is important to note that neither statute, by its language,
requires conduct under color of law or state action. Thus, literally
read, both statutes would reach purely private conduct.
In United States v. Guest,269 six defendants were indicted under
section 241 for criminal conspiracy to deprive black citizens of several
rights secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, e.g., equal access to public accommodations without racial
discrimination. Their defense was that the indictments did not charge
an offense under the laws of the United States because there was no
allegation of "under color of law," reasoning that the charges were
based on violation of the equal protection clause27  which speaks to
the states and protects individuals against state action, not wrongs
done by individuals. Without deciding the issue of the scope of sec-
tion 241, the Court reversed the dismissal of the indictments on
grounds that a certain one of the allegations was sufficient to allege
state action.
In a concurring opinion by Justice Clark,17 1 three Justices 72 ex-
pressed the view that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 73 clearly
empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies that inter-
fere with fourteenth amendment rights, whether or not state action
was involved. However, they did not commit themselves on the issue
of whether section 241 was itself such a congressional act. In a
separate opinion, three Justices2 74 expressed the view that not only did
Congress have the power to reach such conspiracies by purely private
individuals, but that Congress had already exercised that power in
section 241Y.15
269. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
270. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1:
No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.
271. 383 U.S. at 762.
272. justices Clark, Black and Fortas.
273. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].
274. Justices Brennan, Douglas and Chief justice Warren.
275. 383 U.S. at 777.
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[A] conspiracy to interfere with the right to equal utilization of
state facilities ... is a conspiracy to interfere with a 'right...
secured . by the Constitution' within the meaning of Sec-
tion 241-without regard to whether state officers partici-
pated .... Section 241 reaches such a private conspiracy, not
because the Fourteenth Amendment of its own force prohibits
such ... , but because Section 241, as an exercise of congres-
sional power under Section 5 of that Amendment, prohibits all
conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of a 'right ... secured
.. by the Constitution' and because the right to equal utilization
of state facilities is a 'right... secured . by the Constitution'
within the meaning of Section 241.
The Court also discussed section 241 in United States v. Price2 7
Without deciding its scope of coverage, the Court did say that the
language of section 241 "is plain and unlimited... [and] embraces
all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens by all of the Con-
stitution and all of the laws of the United States.2 77
The section may very well be about to attain the full scope indi-
cated by its literal wording. If it does, then it will reach all con-
spiracies to deprive citizens of rights secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, and the presence of action, either "state"
or "under color of law," will become irrelevant. The case which hope-
fully portends such a holding is United States v. Johnson,278 an action
under section 241 in which the lower court dismissed because it felt
that the 1964 Civil Rights Act provided the exclusive remedy. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, reversed and remanded the section 241
indictment for trial.
The hopeful point is that the opinion refers to "outside hoodlums"
who assaulted black citizens for exercising their right to equality in
public accommodations under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.27 1 The impli-
cation is that only a purely private conspiracy was involved and that
section 241 reaches it. If that interpretation prevails, then the views
of Justices Brennan and Douglas and Chief Justice Warren in Guest 28 0
will have become the majority view of the Court.
276. 383 U.S. 78 (1966) (unanimous decision).
277. 383 U.S. at 800 (emphasis in original).
278. 390 U.S. 563 (1968).
279. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
280. justice Marshall took no part in Johnson. justices Stewart, Black and flarlan
dissented on the ground that the 1964 Civil Rights Act provided an exclusive remedy
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Turning to the civil side, section 1985(3) has not enjoyed such a
development. The provision was not considered by the Supreme Court
until Collins v. Hardyman.8' Plaintiffs' theory for damages in that
case was that defendants had conspired to break up their political
meeting and thereby violated their rights to peaceably assemble. The
Court held that the complaint did not state a cause of action under
section 1985(3). The majority construed the section to require a
conspiracy which had as its purpose the depriving of any person of
the equal protection of the laws. Thus, the majority reasoned, the
conspiracy by private individuals could not affect the plaintiffs' equal
protection because private discrimination is not "inequality before the
law.,,282
The dissent,18 joined by Justices Burton, Black, and Douglas,
read the statute as the Court may have read section 241 in United
States v. Johnson.2 14 The dissent asserted that the clear language of
section 1985(3)2 '5 refutes any suggestion that under color of state law
is necessary for the cause of action. Rather, Congress has exercised its
power in that section to create a federal cause of action in aid of
persons injured by private individuals by deprivation of constitutional
rights.
Since Collins, the lower federal courts have dismissed a large num-
ber of cases brought under section 1985(3), usually on the grounds
that plaintiff failed to show intentional discrimination or that a federal
right existed. 6 On the other hand, the language of section 1985(3)
is generally the same as that of section 241, which is now arguably
construed to reach all conspiracies, including those purely private,
which have the purpose and effect of depriving persons of their rights
secured by the Constitution. Other than the precedent of Collins,
under the circumstances. The dissent did not mention problems of state action or under
color of law.
281. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
282. 341 U.S. at 661. The majority did leave open the possibility of a private con-
spiracy of "such magnitude" that could work a deprivation of equal protection of the
laws. As a possible example, the Court cited the post Civil War Ku Klux Klan. Id. at 662.
283. Id. at 663.
284. See note 278 and accompanying text supra.
285. See note 268 supra.
286. See T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, PoLnCAL AND CIV=L RiGHTS Ix THE
UNITEn STATES 1093 and cases cited therein (student ed. 1967).
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there appears no reason for not construing sections 241 and 1985(3)
consistently as sections 242 and 1983 are construed consistently.
Assuming this analysis is correct and that the dissent in Collins will
be accepted by a majority of the Court as law, consideration is now
given to possible causes of action by black farmers in the context of
FES, FHA and ASCS programs. Although conspiracy must be proved,
the civil remedy would allow the plaintiff to go against any defendant,
whether federal, state or private. Thus, whether a given program is
directly federal or not becomes irrelevant. On the other hand, it
would be difficult to sue an entire unit of a particular program since,
presumably, it would usually not be possible to prove that officials of
the FHA state office, for example, entered the agreement, which
constituted the conspiracy, to deny equal treatment to black farmers.
Section 1985(3), under the above analysis, would be most useful
at the very local level and against smaller conspiracies formed for
more particular purposes. A good example would be a hotly contested
ASCS election in which black farmers have organized to elect a black
man. If, in this regard, black farm families in the area are intimidated
by purely private action, as for example night riders, section 242287
will not apply against them. Section 1985 (3), on the other hand, and
if construed consistently with section 241, might allow a civil remedy
for such conduct.
A final weakness of section 1985(3) is that it provides only for
damages. Unlike section 1983, injunctive relief is not mentioned. How-
ever, Brewer v. Hoxie School Distric2 s8 holds that rights protected
by section 1985(3) may also be protected by injunction in certain
cases. That case also involves racial discrimination and rights to equal
protection. Furthermore, in the example of the ASCS election, the
only adequate remedy would be one in equity which prevented the
defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' rights to organize and vote.
5. Jurisdictional Problems
In bringing actions in federal court to secure relief for the depriva-
tion of rights explored in this comment, plaintiffs must deal with the
287. See notes 234-236 and accompanying text supra.
288. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
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usual procedural hurdles involved in seeking judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions." 9 One of those hurdles, the problem of jurisdic-
tion, is particularly significant and will be briefly discussed.290
Before turning to the problem of jurisdiction, it should be noted
that the actions envisioned will appropriately be brought as class
actions seeking injunctive relief. Because of the nature of the illegal
activity and the large size of the groups involved, class actions have
been quite commonly used in recent years to enjoin discriminatory
practices, including segregation in education and in the use of public
facilities.29' An order ending discrimination against one black farmer
289. E.g., justiciability, ripeness, standing, jurisdiction, reviewability, exhaustion of
remedies.
290. Of the other possible problems, only exhaustion or reviewability might cause
difficulties in the suits discussed in this comment. As to exhaustion, the administrative
remedies for discrimination by FES are detailed in the text at notes 143-146 supra.
A direct program such as ASCS is covered by 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.50-15.52 (1970). Sec-
tion 15.51 prohibits discrimination in direct programs in terms similar to Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Section 15.52 provides for filing of complaints by "any person
who believes himself or any specific class of individuals" to be subjected to prohibited
discrimination. If the program has a regular procedure established for complaints or
appeals, the complaint is to be filed within that system with the agency sending a copy
and action reports to the Secretary. If there is no established procedure within the
discriminating program, the complaint goes directly to the Secretary. The investigative
function is discharged by the Office of the Inspector General. Nowhere is there a
specification that corrective action must be taken or what it might be. There is just
the prohibition of discrimination and provision that amounts to giving notice to the
Secretary that discrimination has occurred. Such remedies can easily be exhausted, and
they probably could be ignored as inadequate.
Judicial review of the kind of problems discussed in this comment would appear to
be clearly available to program recipients. The arguments in favor of reviewability
together with the possible hazards are adequately set out for the interested reader in
Note, The Federal Agricultural Stabilization Program and the Negro, 67 CoLum. L. REv.
1121, 1129-1130 (1967) and Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices,
67 CoLum. L. Rzv. 84, 121-124 (1967). If not otherwise provided, judicial review of
agency action may be obtained under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act except
to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review or agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1964). One should keep in mind that
"Generally, judicial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act of a
government official which is in excess of his express or implied powers." Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-582 (1958). In short, there is today what has been called a
presumption of reviewability. Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 929, 952 (1968). In spite of criticism, occasionally one will find a court implying
non-reviewability from the fact that Congress provided for judicial review of actions
of other provisions under the same act but not of actions under the contested provision.
This harks back to a pre-Administrative Procedure Act case: Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943). For a recent example, see Paducah
Junior College v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 255 F. Supp. 147 (W.D.
Ky. 1966).
291. Class actions are permitted by FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For a small sample of the
many cases, see Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963), Orleans Parish School
Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 1957), Kansas City v. Williams, 205 F.2d
47, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1953). For a discussion of the intricacies of class actions in this
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would do nothing about stopping the wholesale practice against his
numerous fellow sufferers. Hence, an effective end to racial discrimina-
tion in FES, FHA and ASCS programs depends upon relief provided
by a class action which runs to the entire class of black farmers
affected.
The federal courts, being courts of limited jurisdiction,2 2 are con-
trolled by specific jurisdictional grants from Congress. For the most
part, the discriminatory practices complained of will not lead to
claims involving amounts greater than $10,000 required for jurisdic-
tion under the general federal question statute 9 Plaintiffs may not
cumulate their individual damages to arrive at the required jurisdic-
tional amount 94
For actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983295 and 1985 (1964),298 juris-
diction may be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964)297 without regard
to any jurisdictional amount. 98 An action against FHA based on
section 1982299 would fall under the civil rights jurisdictional statute00
and thereby escape the jurisdictional amount requirement. Presumably,
an action based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964301 would
context, see Note, Parties Plaintiff in Civil Rights Litigation, 68 CoLua. L. REv. 893
(1968).
292. See C. WRMIT, HANDBOOX OF THE LAW or FmDERA CoUars 14 (1963).
293. 28 US.C. § 1331 (1964).
294. Hague v. CI.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
295. See note 235 and text accompanying notes 246-294 supra.
296. See note 268 and text accompanying notes 281-288 supra.
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the
deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act
done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in
preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge
were about to occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
298. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 US. 496 (1939); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 US.
157 (1943).
299. See text supra at notes 161-188.
300. The applicable subsection is 1343(4). See note 297 supra. See also Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 US. 409, 412 n.1 (1968).
301. See text supra at notes 137-146.
781
Washington Law Review
also find jurisdiction under section 1343 (4) since Title VI is "an Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights." ' 2
Actions against the federal government based on purely constitu-
tional arguments cannot be grounded on section 1343 because they
do not involve deprivations "under color of any state law,' 303 nor do
they come under any "Act of Congress providing for the protection of
civil rights." ' 4 However, for Department of Agriculture programs
which are usually passed pursuant to the commerce power of Con-
gress, jurisdiction can be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337305 without regard
to the amount in controversy.3086
302. See note 297 supra.
303. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964) supra note 297.
304. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964) supra note 297.
305. 28 U.S.C. 1337 (1964):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceed-
ing arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade
and commerce against restraints and monopolies.
306. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
The question of standing should also be noted in passing. In the general welfare area,
standing to challenge agency action by the welfare beneficiary is sometimes quite
elusive. An example of the more or less model welfare case where no standing is found
is Barlow v. Collins, 398 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1968). There, tenant farmers receiving
benefits under the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, 7 U.S.C. § 1444 (Supp. V, 1969),
in the form of land diversion payments, challenged a regulation which permitted assign-
ment of the payments to them for rent, thereby depriving the tenants of bargaining
power with merchants and suppliers which they had previously enjoyed. The Fifth
Circuit held that there was no standing where nothing more than mere economic
harm made possible by the government action was shown, unless there was an express
or implied statutory grant of standing or a grant of jurisdiction to the courts to review
the Secretary's action. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that a "property"
in the benefits was being deprived in violation of fifth amendment due process. That
argument hinged on a stated policy of the Secretary acting to protect the interests of
tenants which was written into the act.
For a good discussion of area, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAxv. L. Rav. 1439, (1968). See also, Note,
Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L REv. 84, 124-29 (1967),
for a treatment of recent cases to detect an emerging criterion for standing in welfare
cases: "legislative intent to protect." For a comparative treatment see also Dugan,
Standing, The "New Property," and the Costs of Welfare: Dilemmas in American and
West German Provider-Administration, 45 WAsH. L. Rav. 497 (1970).
Unlike the general welfare area, plaintiffs in the suits contemplated here will have no
standing problems. The key lies in the fact that we are dealing with a constitutional
right to be free of invidious racial discrimination by the government.
Surely, if Congress passed a law providing specified benefits for white citizens only,
a black citizen could seek and obtain judicial review of the law's constitutionality. His
status as citizen, his right to equal participation in society (which in a sense is what his
right not to be discriminated against on racial grounds means) is being denied by the
government. So also, failure of government agencies, or government-financed private
organizations (insofar as their activity may be deemed government action), to ad-
minister their programs nondiscriminatorily should be contestable by the black segment
of their intended beneficiaries.
One has but to reflect on the fact that no question was raised of the plaintiff's
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CONCLUSION
The problems are enormous, and made even more difficult to attack
because the federal government has helped to create and perpetuate
them. In our legal system, there still are unusual and sometimes im-
possible obstacles which exist to block those who seek to encourage
the "sovereign" to administer its own welfare programs in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner. It is anomolous that the central govern-
ment, which is so concerned with the explosion of the inner-city,
would allow its welfare programs to fail so completely as regards the
southern black farmer and his family, thus forcing them to flee the
rural South for the northern ghettos.
Perhaps widespread political organization among the farmers them-
selves, or basic statutory changes in the existing programs, or even
new programs will be necessary before the quality of life for the
southern black farmer is made better. However, the premise of this
comment, whether valid or not, is that the existing farm welfare
programs are basically workable and will better the life of the south-
ern black farmer, if and when the factor of racial discrimination is
removed.
To reach the desired goal through judicial action, this comment
has surveyed the possible statutory legal actions existing under 18
U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1983. In
addition, the following possibly pivotal legal theories and legal actions
have been considered:
(1) Federal Extension Service-class actions against land-grant
college administrators who direct the FES program in a given state,
as well as all lesser FES personnel, under a school desegregation
approach as characterized in Green, or Title VI of the 1964 Civil
standing to challenge the denial of equal protection in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 713 (1961), where the Negro plaintiff challenged the refusal of
a restaurant in the parking facility to serve him. Nor was there a question in Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), when Negro citizens of the town claimed they had an
equal right to use the park. In both these cases, plaintiffs were members of a subset
(blacks) of the larger class (citizens), and no legitimate government purpose was
furthered by distinguishing them for different treatment. A similar case is presented
here. When the black approaches the agricultural offices for their services he carries
with him a right not to be discriminated against for racial reasons; the agents, being
a part of the government, have a correlative duty not to discriminate. Breach of that
duty gives rise to a judicially cognizable harm. Van Alstyne, supra, categorizes this
argument as the equal protection exception to the right-privilege distinction.
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Rights Act, to enjoin further discrimination and to obtain workable
plans which would assure that extension service would henceforth
be provided on an equal basis;
(2) Farmers Home Administration-class actions against the Sec-
cretary of Agriculture, the national director of FHA, FHA area ad-
ministrators, state and county and lesser FHA personnel, under the
thirteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 and Jones v.
Mayer, seeking to enjoin the defendants from continuing to provide
assistance unequally as between white and black farmers, and seeking
the affirmative relief of directing the defendants to fashion whatever
plans or regulations are necessary to assure fair administration of
FHA benefits, and possibly money damages;
(3) Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service-class ac-
tions against the Secretary of Agriculture, ASCS administrators, state
directors, state committees, county committees and lesser ASCS per-
sonnel, seeking an order that defendants void any committee election
in which full and equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote has
been denied to black farmers, either directly because of committee
activity, or because of harassing activities by outside hoodlums, on
the theory that failure to void the election denies fifth amendment
'"equal protection" by depriving one of the right to vote for racial
reasons, and the right to have his vote possess equal value.
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